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ABSTRACT

Medical informed consent has been governed by the principle o f autonomy. How
autonomy is conceived and codified has led to current understanding and behavior
expectations in healthcare decisionmaking. It has become obvious that the consequences
for those who do not share the dominant view are potentially problematic.
This thesis begins with a consideration of some o f the ethical problems encountered
within the current framework o f informed consent. It traces the historical development of
informed consent as a philosophical and legal concept with multidimensional influences.
An analysis of the autonomy paradigm based in a concept o f liberal individualism is
presented. This is then contrasted with a relationship-centered care perspective as an
alternate moral framework for healthcare decisionmaking. Finally, a redefined notion of
autonomy and reconception o f roles and relationships that considers a relational
normative framework within informed consent is proposed as a more inclusive,
individual focused model for healthcare decisionmaking.
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INTRODUCTION

The concept of informed consent at first seems to be so widely accepted that it hardly
seems worth discussion any more. Anyone entering the healthcare system will quickly be
asked to consent to something, large or small. A person cannot have a procedure done as
inpatient or outpatient without being handed or verbally given a long list of potential risks
o f the prospective procedure, and is always asked to sign some kind of consent form.
This is the current state o f the art o f informed consent. It has been the case since the
emergence of legalized, detailed consent forms in the late 1960s. It all seems so mundane.
At the same time, the concept of informed consent is the heart of contemporary
bioethics. But as one delves deeper into the field, especially in clinical bioethics, the
contrast between what is intended by the popular notions versus the formal or legalistic
notions of informed consent becomes obvious. This contrast is the reason for this thesis.
The predominant approach in bioethics theory to the issue of informed consent as an
expression of self-determination has been that o f trying to define those elements of
autonomy that are required in order to satisfy a condition o f informed consent. This
approach stems from a concern that those who are capable o f autonomous
decisionmaking should be enabled to do so, and those who do not have the capacity
should be protected from potentially harmful or unwanted bodily invasion by those in
medicine and research. It also stems from strong legalistic concerns that favor proof of
1
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informed consent and therefore require satisfaction of certain elements in that proof. An
even stronger bias is the assumption that all or nearly all persons want to make their own
decisions and that if those decisions are to be considered rational, they must include all
relevant information available for consideration. The first two concerns, that o f enabling
autonomous persons to make their own decisions and protection for nonautonomous
persons, are concerns regarding the well-being and autonomous expressions o f
individuals concerning their bodies, healthcare, and sometimes death. The legal concerns
have more to do with satisfying a need for a false sense of security from liability in the
practice and provision of medicine and healthcare. The concern regarding rationality of
decisionmaking stems from a particular view o f the self, others, and the way persons go
about making decisions. However, it seems in retrospect that what was unwittingly
accomplished by these concerns and under these assumptions was to promote a
particularly narrow perspective of what personal autonomy means, and to place even
greater distance between patients and professionals in considerations o f the patient's best
interests.
In my experience as a clinical ethicist at the bedside of patients, most in critical and/or
terminal conditions, the traditional application o f bioethics principles to the complex and
personal issues of individual patients and their families and loved ones was both
fiustrating and inadequate. This approach to moral reasoning seemed cold, impersonal
and wholly detached from the reality of the situation. Considering the expressed or
assumed interests of the patient as the primary and ultimate value likewise seemed
inadequate, leaving the patient's intimate others in a role of little importance or
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consequence in facing the circumstances of the patient's death. This experience led very
quickly to reconsidering the approach called "principlism" as appropriate for universal
application in such situations. Something very intimate and immediate was missing. It
did not fit the situation. All too often I found myself resorting to other methods,
primarily that known as narrative process ethics, in approaching decisionmaking with
families o f patients. It seemed more morally appropriate than the predominant approach
because o f its responsiveness and consideration o f particulars and it led to a morally
acceptable outcome for those involved.
Another area of difficulty was with the predominant conception o f autonomy as the
property of a self-interested, self-directed, self-actualized independent person capable of
fully articulating one's own values as they pertain to a medical situation. The judgment
of another's rationality in decisionmaking based on such a view o f the self did not mesh
with my intuitions concerning the decisionmaking o f the patients and families I
encountered. For example, many levels of influence play a role in the decisionmaking
process and it seems appropriate that sometimes they should. Sometimes it is appropriate
to attempt to persuade a patient to a particular course o f treatment especially when the
benefits are high and certain and the risks are low and unlikely. However, this is not to
say that the only time influence is justifiable is when it promotes the view of medicine.
Other views may help a patient clarify previously unknown or underdeveloped values in a
new situation, or reconsider previously steadfast ones that no longer seem appropriate.
Yet other views are routinely dismissed, ignored or viewed as coercive by healthcare
professionals if they differ from the medical view. Similarly, persons who do not fit the
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profile o f autonomy as defined, or who as surrogates do not blindly follow the expressed
wishes o f the patient, are judged by professionals as unfit for decisionmaking. As the
numbers o f individuals who fall into this category grew, it seemed to me that the
definition o f autonomy for decisionmaking is too narrow to accommodate the realities of
persons and what coimts as appropriate for autonomous decisions. My intuitions about
persons and where the boundaries between autonomous and non-autonomous decisions
fell were outside the current boundaries drawn in most bioethics theory. The questions
that surfaced included, what really is autonomy? Could it be that all these individuals
who do not meet this definition or accept it are not autonomous? Or is it the definition
itself that is the problem?
The problem of articulating a justifiable moral account o f autonomy in informed
consent is the root o f this thesis. The predominant approach in bioethics theory has been
one from the individualist, rationalist tradition o f moral reasoning. That tradition sets
moral problems in the framework o f competing moral interests of rational individuals. I
argue in this thesis that although that tradition was important as the first wave of
articulation of values in the appropriate use o f medicine and the self-determination o f
patients, it is inadequate for a number of reasons. I argue that the art of healing, which
considers the individual as inseparable from the complex of relationships with others and
one's life experience, must be taught to healthcare professionals as thoroughly as the
science. I argue for a reframing of the concept o f autonomy in the context of healthcare
decisionmaking to one which encompasses a larger, more diverse expression of selfdetermination and which refocuses the roles o f families and professionals in that process.
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CHAPTER 1
PROBLEMS WITH HEALTHCARE DECISIONMAKING AND
INFORMED CONSENT IN AN AUTONOMY PARADIGM

To a large extent, current thinking regarding healthcare decisionmaking and medical
informed consent has emerged as a result o f post-World War II global reactions to Nazi
medical experimentation on concentration camp prisoners and later, the refutation of
medical paternalism common in nearly all medical decisionmaking o f the past. It has
been suggested that these two primary influences eventually culminated in the
development of current bioethical thinking concerning the theoretical imperatives of
patient participation, autonomy as self-determination, and informed consent.' This has,
in turn, led to the development in U. S. bioethics of what is usually considered necessary
for a condition of informed consent. It is generally agreed that, "proper consent requires
decisionmaking capacity; adequate information about risks, benefits and alternatives;
details about the nature of the [proposed] procedure; understanding; and freedom to
refuse the [proposed] procedure."- These requirements concerning information and
capacities for informed consent are based on what is generally understood in
contemporary U. S. bioethics to define patient autonomy or autonomous decisionmaking
in healthcare. Over the past twenty to thirty years, this understanding has become nearly
universal in U. S. bioethics theory and, in most situations is still expected in practices
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concerning informed consent.
The theoretical development of healthcare decisionmaking and informed consent is
grounded in a moral assumption of the duty of respect for the autonomy of others. This
moral grounding is consistent with the ideals of political liberalism on which this country
was founded. However, it has recently become evident that the expectation, indeed the
requirement in law, of its application in virtually all but emergency medical situations has
led to many previously unrecognized problems.
One of the purposes of informed consent is to provide persons with information
concerning a proposed procedure or therapy in order to enhance healthcare
decisionmaking of autonomous persons. This information includes such specifics as the
diagnosis, explanation of the clinician's preferred treatment plan together with potential
risks and benefits, alternative options with risks and benefits, and likely outcomes of
each. It has been assumed by those who initially formulated this concept and many who
followed that this type o f information would assist the autonomous person in making a
decision that would be consistent with fulfillment of the vision o f a good life. This
assumption is based in the value and importance of individual autonomy and the value
and importance of fully informed consent in enhancing individual autonomy. However,
it is also possible that these assumptions may represent a misinformed expectation of
universal acceptance of this moral grounding by those who comprise American society.
Reflection on the pluralistic nature o f our society as well as growing experience using
these assumptions in clinical situations has raised to light some problems inherent in their
universal application.
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This chapter will focus on explicating some of these problems within this paradigm of
an autonomy-based theory o f healthcare decisionmaking and informed consent. These
problems have surfaced over the past several years in various clinical situations within
cross-cultural settings and with families, especially spouses, facing surrogate
responsibilities in decisionmaking. Two of the examples used here come from personal
professional experience. The other two have been published in bioethical and medical
literature.

Cultural Perspectives
Traditional Navajo Perspectives
In late 1995 Carrese and Rhodes released the results of recently completed research
concerning the perspectives of Native Americans from a traditional Navajo tribe in
Arizona concerning information generally required for medical informed consent.^ The
study was intended to assess the efficacy o f the current Westem medical practices of
information and truthtelling in informed consent. Specifically, they focused on the
practices of discussing outcomes of diagnoses and proposed treatments, including
potentially adverse outcomes, with these Navajos for the purposes o f informed consent
and Advance Directives. It is noteworthy that prior to this study very little research has
been done concerning various ethnic communities' cultural values and moral perspectives
concerning common medical practices in the United States in comparison to the dominant
societal, medical and bioethical views. What few studies had been done suggested that
there are significant differences among various cultural communities that should be
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understood and appreciated within the study o f bioethics and medical practice/
Carrese, the principal clinical researcher in this study, had been practicing medicine on a
Navajo reservation in Arizona for 4 years. He had anecdotally noticed that certain
Westem medical and bioethical concepts and practices seemed to regularly conflict with
traditional Navajo values and ways o f thinking.
One o f these areas of conflict revolves around the practice o f discussing "negative
information," such as disclosure of risks, "bad news," such as adverse outcomes, and
advance care planning for critical events, such as Advance Directives. Current standards
of practice, based on the principles o f respect for a person's autonomy and selfdetermination, require direct and explicit discussion o f this type o f information between
healthcare provider and the patient. For example, the principles o f informed consent
require tmthful disclosure of potential risks and outcomes o f diagnoses and proposed
medical treatments. Truthtelling itself requires disclosure o f a likely fatal outcome; and
advance medical care planning requires the discussion and consideration of a serious,
potentially fatal illness in the future. The extent to which these practices are accepted and
expected within the standards o f Westem medicine is evident in the fact that physicians
have successfully been held liable for failure to meet tliese standards.^
However, traditional Navajo culture holds that language and thought do not merely
describe reality; they have the power to shape reality. For this reason, many traditional
Navajos view the discussion o f "negative information" as potentially harmful to their
well-being. A central concept in their worldview is harmony with Nature, being in
balance with all that is in the universe. Navajo healing is not directed toward the
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symptom but toward bringing the whole person into harmony through the use o f symbols
and prayers. This harmony, therefore, must be restored in body, spirit and mind.*
In his study, Carrese interviewed thirty-four Navajos, 16 men and 18 women, six of
whom functioned as traditional healers, and seventeen o f whom spoke only Navajo. Two
dominant themes emerged from the interviews and analysis o f the data. First, the
participants often commented on the importance "to think and speak in a positive way."
The Navajo expression o f this concept can be translated as "think in the Beauty way" and
"talk in the Beauty way," which reflect the Navajo view that thought and language have
the power to shape and control both reality and events.^ It is expressive o f the Navajo
view that health is maintained or restored through positive ritual language.
Another side to this concept is that healthcare providers should avoid thinking or
speaking in a negative way. Such thoughts and language by healthcare professionals
distressed many traditional Navajos since their view is that negative thoughts and words
can result in direct harm. What is considered routine discussions for informed consent
for surgery, for example, including the remote risk o f death, can so severely affect a
traditional Navajo patient that she may refuse the surgery as if a death sentence, no matter
how physically necessary the surgery is from a medical perspective and how statistically
remote the potential risks.*
The second revealing theme of the study involves the Navajo perspective concerning
advance medical care planning through Advance Directives. One of the primary goals o f
the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) of 1991 was to increase patient participation
in their own end-of-life decisionmaking by encouraging adults to consider and reflect on
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the possibility of a profoundly debilitating, life-threatening illness in the future.’ To this
end, the Act requires that all adults admitted to hospitals and other facilities be provided
with written material concerning state laws and facility policies regarding the patient's
right to formulate advance directives. In addition, it requires that education be provided
to staff and the community about issues concerning advance directives. In 1992, the
Indian Health Service adopted the requirements o f the PSDA and stated that, "Tribal
customs and traditional beliefs that relate to death and dying will be respected to the
extent possible when providing information to patients on these issu es."C arrese
reported that 86% o f the Navajo participants in his study stated in one way or another that
this practice was "a dangerous violation of traditional Navajo values and ways of
thinking." Only three of the twenty two respondents (14%) found this practice
acceptable, and they were Navajos trained in Westem medical healthcare and employed
by the Indian Health Service."
Although the participants in this study do not reflect the views of some Navajos more
aculturated to mainstream U. S. society, their views do seem widely held within the
Navajo culture as a whole.'- It has also been pointed out that there is a great amount o f
homogeneity within the Native American nations concerning many traditional views as
expressed by these Navajos.'^ Thus the requirements o f the PSDA for universal
application to all admitted patients and the education o f staff and members of the
community are, the authors point out, ethically troublesome. With respect to the
traditional Navajo community, advance care planning and informed consent discussions
may well be viewed as potentially harmful to the individual who holds traditional Navajo
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views.
Such findings suggest that there needs to be much reflection and perhaps remodeling
of the requirements o f both federal law and Indian Health Services policy due to the
potentially profound adverse effects on the well being o f Native American peoples. In
addition, these findings further suggest that the prevailing Westem medical concepts and
practices, and the prevailing principles of U. S. bioethics, are not universally held or
accepted even within the boundaries of this country. The pluralistic society that
comprises the whole has within it communities o f people who do not identify with the
dominant values.

Korean-American and Mexican-American Perspectives
At the same time as the Carrese research publication in 1995, Blackball, et al.,
published their findings of a survey of four ethnic groups concerning disclosure o f
diagnosis and prognosis of terminal illness and end-of-life decisionmaking.'■* The survey
sample of 800 subjects, sixty five years and older with equal numbers o f men and
women, were individuals firom one of the following ethnic groups: Korean-American,
Mexican-American, African-American or European-American.
This study differed somewhat from the Carrese study in that it focused on the
prevailing moral principle of respect for and importance of individual autonomy and selfdetermination as the basis of current informed consent practices. This principle asserts
the right of individuals to make healthcare decisions for themselves based on relevant
information. Thus, the importance of tmthtelling is integral for those charged with the
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duty of respect for others' autonomy. As previously noted, truthtelling is generally
understood in this context to include the truth regarding the person's diagnosis, risks and
benefits of proposed treatments, and options to the proposed treatment with risks and
benefits. This kind o f truth is also generally understood to include information about
fatal illnesses and discussions and planning regarding end-of-life medical options. As the
authors point out, however.
This focus on patient autonomy has become overly narrow and...other values, such as
family integrity...have been ignored. In particular, some have argued that this
preoccupation with individual rights to the exclusion of other values may reflect a
cultural bias on the part o f the Westem medical and bioethics communities.'*
This study focused on attitudes toward autonomy in relation to ethnicity, age,
religion, level o f education, and income. Other factors were also included, such as
functional status, acculturation, access to healthcare, and experience with illness and with
treatment limitation issues, including withholding and withdrawing life-support.
Interviews were conducted by trained persons whose ethnic backgrounds matched those
of the four groups in the study, and who were bilingual if Korean-American or MexicanAmerican.
The outcome o f the study is as revealing as the Carrese study. Korean-Americans
(47%) and Mexican-Americans (65%) were significantly less likely than EuropeanAmericans (87%) and African-Americans (88%) to believe that a person should be told
the truth regarding the specific diagnosis o f metastatic cancer. Likewise, KoreanAmericans and Mexican-Americans were significantly less likely than either AfricanAmericans or European-Americans to believe that a person should be told o f any terminal
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prognosis, or that the person should be asked to make decisions regarding the use of lifesupport. Both Korean-Americans and Mexican-Americans (57% and 45%, respectively)
also believed that the family should make these decisions. Regardless of the differences
in groups regarding truthtelling to the patient, 90% of all the participants in all groups
believed that the fam ily should be told the truth about the diagnosis and prognosis. "The
difference is that the Korean-Americans and Mexican-Americans were more likely to
believe that only the family and not the patient should be told the tmth.'"*
O f further interest in this study is that the degree of acculturation o f MexicanAmericans had a direct correlation as to whether they agreed that the patient should be
told the truth about their diagnosis and prognosis. Those with a higher degree of
acculturation were more likely to agree. Those with less acculturation (79%of the
Mexican-American group) were less likely to agree. However, acculturation itself had no
significant effect on the choice of the patient as primary decisionmaker, with the majority
believing that the family should make the decisions, as noted above. Interestingly, 100%
of the Korean-American participants scored so little in acculturation factors that they
could not be included in this part o f the study. The degree o f acculturation was not
related to the length o f time living in the United States, for both Korean-Americans and
Mexican-Americans. For Mexican-Americans acculturation was, however, directly
related to either income (greater than $10,000 per year) or years o f education (6 years or
more) or both.
For Korean-Americans and Mexican-Americans, agreement with truthtelling and
patient as primary decisionmaker were related to higher levels o f education.
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socioeconomic status and age, in that older, lower income and less educated participants
were less likely to agree. For European and African-Americans, however, socioeconomic
status alone did not predict attitudes toward patient autonomy and decisionmaking. It
seems, then, that factors of socioeconomic status are more directly related to
acculturation, and the degree of acculturation is then related to attitudes regarding patient
information, autonomy, tmthtelling and decisionmaking.
The authors suggest that the decisionmaking style o f both Korean-Americans and
Mexican-Americans can be described as family-centered. In both groups, it is the
responsibility of the family, rather than the patient, to bear the burden o f bad news and
subsequent decisionmaking. This is seen in other ethnic groups as well, such as in Italy,
Greece and Japan, and in Chinese and Ethiopian immigrants." In these groups,
autonomy and tmthtelling is viewed not as empowering, but rather as isolating and
burdensome to those who are sick.
Blackball, et al., conclude that the ideal o f patient autonomy and self-determination is
far from universal. The high value placed on open discussion, information and the right
of the patient to choose for oneself in Westem medical and bioethical models are likewise
not shared by all members of U. S. society. As they suggest, persons live, get sick and
die within the context of their family and culture, embedded in the woven fabric of
relationships, rather than as solitary individuals. "For those who hold the family-centered
model, a higher value may be placed on the harmonious functioning o f the family than on
the autonomy o f its individual members.'"* The insistence on the autonomy model by the
medical and bioethics communities may be perceived as a violation, or harm, o f cultural
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values and conventions when they insist on telling the patient the truth. Thus, forcing an
autonomy model o f medical decisionmaking when that model is contrary to the familycentered values of some patients and their families may well be just another form o f
medical paternalism, in essence a reconstructed, new and yet not new meaning o f the old
phrase, the doctor knows best.

Substituted Judgment. Best Interests,
and the Familv: Two Cases
When persons under medical treatment do not have the capacity to make decisions
concerning their healthcare options, including the options of life-sustaining treatments,
the prevailing view in prominent bioethics literature and tort law is that incapacitated
persons have the same rights (autonomy, self-determination and privacy) as persons who
have decisional capacity.” However, for those who do not have decisional capacity a
surrogate decisionmaker is appointed to exercise this right on their behalf. Most often in
healthcare settings, if the patient did not previously appoint someone to act as their
surrogate a family member or close friend is appointed informally, that is, not through the
c o u r t . S o m e states, including Nevada, provide a delineated hierarchy o f family
members for the order in which a surrogate may be informally appointed.*'
It is generally accepted in current U. S. bioethics that there are two substantive
standards for guiding surrogates in decisionmaking. Although neither o f these standards
has a clear grounding in respect for autonomy, nonetheless appeals to autonomy rights are
frequently used in defense of their use by both bioethicists in theory and defense lawyers
in court".
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One standard is that of best interests. Under this standard, a surrogate makes
decisions regarding healthcare treatments for what is believed to be the highest benefit to
the patient based on a comparative assessment o f benefits and burdens of the various
options, including life-sustaining treatments. As usually understood in the bioethics and
legal literature, "The best interests standard protects another's well-being by assessing
risks and benefits o f various treatments and alternatives to treatment including
consideration of pain and suffering, and by evaluating [the likelihood of] restoration or
loss o f functioning. It is therefore inescapably a quality o f life criterion."^
Respect for autonomy is a consideration within this standard insofar as various
autonomous preferences of the person may be known, and, thus, may affect
interpretations of quality of life considerations.-'* Such is usually not the case, however.
This standard is usually considered most appropriate for persons who never had
decisional capacity and whose preferences regarding the proposed treatment cannot be
known. Quality o f life considerations are generally understood in this context to entail
not the socioeconomic worth of the individual, but rather, the value of this life under
these circumstances for the one who must live it. As understood, however, it may also
seem to inadvertently allow other considerations and biases to creep into the equation in
the decisionmaking process of the surrogate, albeit unintentionally, which are not
necessarily in the best interests of the patient.
The other standard is that o f substituted judgment. This standard is usually
understood within a medical context to entail decisionmaking by a surrogate based on
previous knowledge as to whether the person would have consented or refused such
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proposed treatments in the specific, or sufficiently similar, circumstances at hand. In this
understanding of substituted judgment, protection o f the rights o f autonomy, selfdetermination and privacy are the primary intent.^ It is, in general, perhaps most
appropriately applied in cases of patients who once did but no longer have decisional
capacity.
The well-known case o f Karen Ann Quinlan in 1975 was the first to actually refer to
this standard for surrogate decisions in a healthcare, life-sustaining treatment context.-*
In this case, substituted judgment was understood as requiring direct knowledge o f the
patient's previously expressed autonomous preferences regarding the proposed treatment
under the specific, or very similar, circumstances. Thus defined, it may be understood as
a primarily subjective interpretation of the standard.
More recently, however, substituted judgment is widely accepted both in courts and
in bioethics theory as a process whereby the surrogate substitutes her judgment regarding
proposed treatment for what may be the specifically unknown, yet substantially arguable,
presumed wishes of the person who does not have decisional capacity. Such an
understanding was first applied in the Saikewitz case.-’ This differential understanding
has been viewed in the literature on bioethical theory and law as an objectification of the
subjective standard. In this understanding, a surrogate may consider a variety of factors
from which the patient's subjective intent can be inferred. Such factors may include, but
are not limited to, what most others would likely want under the same circumstances, the
patient's age, probable side effects of treatment, chances o f cure and whether temporary
or permanent, the likelihood of additional suffering caused by the treatment, and the
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patient’s ability to cooperate with the treatment, so as to avoid physical restraints and thus
cause further pain, suffering and fear.-*
These two standards, best interests and substituted judgment, are the primary sources
o f guidance given to surrogates for making decisions regarding healthcare options for
another person. They can provide some o f the guidance needed for some surrogates in
some circumstances. This is especially the case in situations in which the surrogate is
unsure about what to decide because of uncertainties concerning previously stated
preferences of the now incapacitated person (substituted judgment), or completely
unknown and never expressed preferences (best interests). However, problems can and
do arise within the limitations of these standards particularly in situations involving
surrogates, usually close family members and especially spouses, who may know the
patient's wishes but for a variety o f reasons are unable to effect those wishes. These
problems may be traceable to the autonomy-based model o f decisionmaking from which
they have emerged, and which they are largely intended to support. In addition, the broad
acceptance o f these two standards for surrogate decisionmaking by theorists, the courts
and healthcare professionals as appropriate basis for such deliberations may have created
an atmosphere in which the expectation is that surrogates adhere to these two standards
exclusively. When a surrogate does not, the judgmental reaction toward the surrogate by
healthcare professionals involved in the patient's care may result in added distress for the
surrogate at the least. At the worst, it may at times result in outright hostility toward the
surrogate, depending on the degree o f discomfort for these professionals caused by what
is perceived as a threat or disregard o f the patient's autonomy rights. The following two
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cases are presented as an illustration o f the kinds o f problems referred to above.

Case #1: Mrs. B’’
The patient, Mr. B, was an eighty-five year old patient in the Intensive Care Unit
(ICU). He had been admitted three weeks prior with known cancer o f the prostate which
had metastasized to the liver, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and chronic
coronary artery disease. Very shortly after admission, Mr. B went into shock followed by
a respiratory arrest that led to his admission to the ICU. Since that event, he remained on
the ventilator and subsequently developed what is known as multiple organ system failure
or total body failure, including adult respiratory distress syndrome, renal failure requiring
daily dialysis, sepsis and deep vein thrombosis. In addition, a new retroperitoneal mass
had been found and was assumed to be additional metastasis from the prostate cancer.
All indications, as noted by virtually all of the medical specialists, were that the
expectation o f survival for Mr. B under these circumstances was essentially nil. It was
agreed by all professional staff that Mr. B's life would end soon, and that removal o f all
life-sustaining treatments to allow for a natural death process with maximal comfort
measures would be the most that medicine could offer him.
Mr. B had been responsive and seemed to comprehend what was said to him. He had
recently indicated to his long time physician that he was tired and was ready to die.
When the physician approached Mrs. B, the patient's wife o f sixty-eight years who was
eighty years old herself, regarding withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments, Mrs. B
refused to agree. Two days later, Mr. B was no longer responsive. Since there was no
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advance directive, the situation required the wife to sign a written consent o f agreement
to withdrawal o f treatment.^* Despite numerous attempts by the physician and other
healthcare professionals she remained steadfast in her refusal to agree on the grounds that
she would not permit anyone to cause her beloved husband to die. She sat vigil every day
and into the nights holding his hand in hers. There was no other family to turn to for
support or input for her, or as a resource for the staff. The attending physician felt that on
one hand she was betraying Mr. B's autonomously expressed willingness to withdraw
life-sustaining treatments, and that he was ready to die. Yet, on the other, she felt
responsibility to Mrs. B who also was her patient. Mrs B would have to live with the loss
of her husband and the psychological effects of a refusal to honor her decisions. The
professional staff caring for Mr. B were expressing in verbal and nonverbal language
their growing distrust of Mrs. B. They suggested that either she was too senile to
participate in the consent on behalf o f her husband or she had ulterior motives such as
pension or social security income that were influencing her refusal to "let the poor man
die." It was also suggested by some professional staff that perhaps the hospital should
consider legal action against her for not respecting his autonomy rights, not acting in
good faith according to the expressed wishes of her husband, and that as a result she was
causing him harm.^'
When one took time to sit with Mrs. B, to talk with her and listen to her story about
why she refused to consent, however, a different understanding of her motivations
emerged. She was well aware o f how critically ill her husband was, of their physician's
the conversation with her husband, and o f the fact that her husband would likely die with
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or without the life-sustaining treatments because it was more a matter of when not if he
would die. She knew that in order to remove the life-sustaining treatments her signature
was required in giving consent. She was also well aware that virtually all o f the
professional staff she encountered wanted and expected her to sign the consent, and that
her refusal to do so was causing "some unpleasantness" by them.
When asked about her understanding of her husband's pain and suffering as a result of
the invasive nature of the treatments he required, she replied that she did not think that he
was in pain. He did not look like he was in pain. Indeed, he hardly moved a muscle, so
how do they know he is in pain? And besides, she was there to smooth his brow, wipe
his face, hold his hand. When asked about her husband's indications that he was tired and
ready to die, she replied that she did not feel that meant he was ready to leave her right
away, right now, today. Rather, they knew that some day they would both die, but if
they could forestall it for as long as possible they could spend as much time together as
possible. She said that she did not believe that he really wanted to leave her. So, as long
as she could still hold his hand, as long as there was still warmth in him, then he still was
with her and she with him. She believed that he knew she was there, even if he could not
show it. These were her reasons for not consenting.

Case #2: Mrs.
Mr. M was an eighty-nine year old man admitted to the hospital known to have endstage cancer of the lung with metastasis to the bone, also suffering progressive weakness,
decreasing mental status and increasing lethargy. He did not have an advance directive.
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and refused to enact one on admission. Two weeks after admission, Mr. M was clearly
deteriorating. Since there were no medical interventions that would significantly enhance
his condition and there was no cure for his illness, the primary physician and medical
specialists agreed that, due to his overall condition, Mr. M would not benefit from any
aggressive medical interventions and should be supported with maximal comfort
measures for however long he would survive. Mr. M was no longer capable o f
participating in his own healthcare decisionmaking.
The primary physician discussed at length with Mrs. M the details o f the situation,
including Mr. M's terminal prognosis and his unlikely survival of aggressive
interventions such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) when his condition
deteriorated further, as inevitably it would. Although viably distraught, Mrs. M agreed
that such interventions would only prolong his dying, and she believed that her husband
would not wish to do that. She also stated that her husband would prefer to die at home,
and she wanted to do that for him. Mr. M's physician wrote orders for treatment
limitations accordingly, and started arrangements to help Mrs. M take her husband home
to die.
On the day Mr. M was to be discharged home with hospice home care, Mrs. M
suddenly told the staff that she had changed her mind and that she would not be taking
her husband home. Furthermore, she wanted the orders changed so that her husband
would receive all treatments available to keep him alive, regardless of the outcome. Later
that day the physician received a phone call from Mr. M's sons in Massachusetts telling
him that they wanted everything done to keep their father alive. When he explained that
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interventions such as CPR would be futile for their father because he would die with or
without them, they said they still wanted everything possible done. The physician was
concerned over the prospect o f being sued by the sons if he did not go along with the
family's wishes, especially since Mrs. M was now expressing the same wishes as the
sons. The professional staff was visibly frustrated by Mrs. M's refusal to remain with her
original decision despite numerous attempts to "reason with her." They felt that she was
in a panic over the prospect of her husband's impending death, and that she was going
against her husband's wishes as she had expressed them so clearly just a few days ago.
Once again, they saw this as a direct betrayal o f her husband since the legal responsibility
for the consent or refusal was hers. Furthermore, they expressed concern that perhaps
she now had other ulterior motives, such as social security income, for changing her mind
so suddenly.
As in the first case, when one sat with Mrs. M to talk with her and listen to her story,
a different understanding again emerged. Both Mr. and Mrs. M were Filipino, bom and
raised in the Philippines, who had come to this country many years ago to make a better
life with more opportunities for their sons. Although they had, in their estimation,
become quite Americanized, and their sons had benefited from an American education
and now successful jobs, they still adhered to some o f the deep-seated traditions o f their
culture. One of these traditions is that the Filipino culture, like many Asian cultures, is
strongly paternalistic. When the head of the household, always the husband/father, is no
longer capable of such responsibilities due either to mental infirmity or other ailment or
death, the eldest son automatically takes over all responsibility for family matters. The
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wife/mother has, in essence, no voice in family decisions, even if she personally disagrees
with decisions made by the son. If the wife/mother should outwardly disagree with the
son's decisions, especially if she takes action that is contrary to such decisions, the
consequences for her are usually quite severe. In her case, Mrs. M would be ostracized
from her family, never allowed to see her grandchildren, cut o ff and left to fend for
herself. Mrs. M viewed this kind of reprisal as too much to bear after losing her husband.
In Filipino culture, family plays a central and essential role in the lives of both women
and men, although in different ways. This is especially true for elderly parents who are
provided for by their adult children. Mrs M felt compelled to honor her son's wishes,
even though she and her husband would have preferred for him to die at home.
As these two cases illustrate, the autonomy model o f decisionmaking has a pervasive
hold on the understanding, expectations and attitudes o f healthcare professionals
regarding the role of surrogates and their decisionmaking process. It is so much so that
when a surrogate does not conform to expectations of enactment of the patient's
autonomy rights, especially when the substituted judgment standard seems most
appropriate, reactions of the staff can at times contribute in subtle and not so subtle ways
to the grief and suffering o f the surrogate, oftentimes an elderly female spouse.
Furthermore, under current law, any surrogate may be removed from their role in critical
decisionmaking if their decisions are perceived to be contrary to the patient's
autonomously expressed wishes.” This type of legislation further promotes and sustains
the prevailing view about the primacy of autonomy rights. Ultimately, it leaves little
room for serious consideration of other, possibly equally legitimate concerns in the
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personal lives of patients and their families for whom individual autonomy does not
overshadow the concerns o f others.

Conclusions
This chapter has focused on presenting a brief overview o f some o f the most widely
held tenets of current bioethical theory and law regarding healthcare decisionmaking,
informed consent, and the role of surrogates in this process. In the first half of the
chapter, the primacy o f an individual's autonomy rights was reviewed as the basis for
healthcare decisionmaking and informed consent. However, as demonstrated in the first
two examples, individual autonomy, as understood and reinforced in policy and law
regarding informed consent, is not as universally held as one might expect given this
country's political foundations in liberal individualism and personal freedoms. In our
collective diversity, many different cultures and ethnic groups remain active and
centrally situated in the lives of many in our society. Many worldviews and ways of
decisionmaking are based on values considering the nature o f relationships that place
things other than the individual at the center of considerations concerning life and death.
They could be viewed, perhaps, as more symbiotic relationships than ones of
independence, self-sufficiency and self-determination.
The second half o f the chapter considered the role o f the surrogate in informed
consent for healthcare decisionmaking based on two widely held standards, best interests
and substituted judgment, both of which are also grounded in respect for individual
autonomy. The two cases demonstrated the kinds o f problems that have begun to surface

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26

in specific situations involving surrogates who do not seem to conform to the expectation,
viewed by some as a legal mandate, to make decisions based on autonomous expressions
of the patient's wishes. This is especially true in situations where the surrogate is
expected to make decisions based on an autonomously expressed intent by the patient
with regard to current circumstances (substituted judgment standard). The expectations
of healthcare professionals regarding the behavior o f surrogates is at least in part due to a
pervasive, possibly rigid, paradigm o f the autonomy model. Within this paradigm, it
seems that little room is left for other considerations o f importance as viewed by those
most intimately in relationship with the patient.
This criticism of the autonomy model it is not intended to completely denigrate all
notions o f respect for the autonomy of others. Rather, it is an attempt to step back out of
the paradigm, to look more critically at it and its effects, and determine if anything more
constructive may in part help to alleviate these problems we are now experiencing in its
wake. To this end, the next chapter will specifically consider the development of current
thinking regarding healthcare decisionmaking, particularly the development of informed
consent for decisionmaking, from a philosophical and legal historic view.
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CHAPTER 2
FOUNDATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT

The notion of informed consent as the basis for decisionmaking in healthcare, one of
the primary tenets of contemporary U. S. medical ethics, is a relatively recent and
particularly Western phenomenon, the result o f a multidimensional process involving
philosophical, political, legal, social and cultural influences. Few if any of the classical
documents of early Western medicine contain a notion of the concept of autonomous
decisionmaking by the patient. On the contrary, decisions concerning the proper course
of action regarding a patient's treatment had been considered largely the domain of
physicians.
This chapter will consider a brief history of the development o f ethics in Western
medicine and the development of the doctrine o f informed consent in contemporary U. S.
medical ethics. It will begin with early conceptions o f the role o f the physician in patientphysician interactions and proceed to contemporary times. The intentions are to identify
and clarify the developmental influences leading to the contemporary notion o f informed
consent for healthcare decisionmaking. These influences come from a variety o f sources
and include the following. First, early roots of an ethos for the practice o f Western
physicians are traced to ancient Greek understanding o f the purpose and practice o f what
was considered a sacred oath of service to the sick. Second, changes in that ethos
30
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affecting patient-physician interactions are shown to derive from Christian clericphysicians whose role was closely linked to divine authority. Third, as liberal political
ideas of the Enlightenment were shaping Western conceptions o f the self and individual
freedoms, the medical profession failed to meaningfully reflect those conceptions in their
attempts to further define their professional role in patient-physician interactions.
However, public acceptance o f the same liberal conceptions o f the self in the context of
medicine led to growing legal support of the patient’s right o f self-determination. This
support was articulated through the emerging legal doctrine as the importance and
necessity of informed consent for healthcare decisionmaking. Fifth, dramatic scientific
and technological advances in medicine and public evidence o f Nazi medical
experimentations on prisoners prompted critical examinations o f ethical conduct for
medical research involving human subjects in the post-World War 11 era. This critique
resulted in the development of ethical standards for Western medical researchers. Sixth,
despite these ethical standards, blatant disregard by U. S. researchers was revealed,
generating public outcry and resulting in U. S. legislation intended to protect human
patients and subjects by forcing compliance with established ethical research standards.
Finally, a remnant of Anglo-American past, that of early settlers with a strong religious
belief in moral rules for guiding actions, is found in twentieth century medical and
biomedical ethics as a grounding for resolving conflicting rights. All of these influences
on U. S. medical culture converged in the second half o f the twentieth century to result in
the development of what is now largely accepted as the necessary participation of patients
in medical decisionmaking through informed consent.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5Z

Early Western Medicine
Western medical practice, including its ethics, is usually traced to ancient Greek
origins, particularly The Oath and other Hippocratic writings rooted in the religious sect
of Pythagoreanism, rather than philosophical writings. Indeed, philosophy was not
formally involved in developing medical ethical standards of practice until the late
twentieth century.' The early practice o f medicine was primarily a healing art, combining
the limited tools o f the time and the patient's natural healing energies with the healing
presence of the physician. Medicine was understood to have specifically limited
purposes. Medical interventions of the time were expected to relieve the distresses of
illness and sometimes cure the ailment. The practitioner was expected to know not only
what actions to take to relieve the patient’s condition, but also when not to intervene, as
in the case of very advanced disease. This was because the physician "know[s]
everything is not possible to medicine."’ Thus, the contemporary notion o f success in
medicine as equated with cure was more a notion o f comforting care, skillful use of
knowledge and tools, healing presence working together with nature, and an
understanding o f the limitations of medicine.
The Hippocratic Oath should be understood as a pledge to attend to the needs of
patients as best one can, without causing undue harm in the process. It proposes, "to help
the sick to the best o f my ability and judgment...[and] abstain from harming or wronging
any man...."’ This part of the Oath has been used as the basis for a claim to beneficence
in the grounding o f physician interactions with patients. Interpretations o f beneficent
actions have been debated in more recent times. Beneficence has been interpreted as

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

condoning patient deception and disregard for a patient’s preferences o f treatment under
the guise o f benefitting the patient to “the best o f my ability and judgment.” Similarly,
the Oath makes no reference to a physician's obligation to converse with a patient.
Indeed, it gives explicit advice on "...concealing most things from the patient while you
are attending to him...revealing nothing o f the patient's future or present condition....'"*
This, too, has historically been used to condone what has been called beneficent
deception, or the practice of concealing a patient’s diagnosis or prognosis under the guise
of protecting the patient from psychological harm. The perspective of the patient
regarding these practices does not enter into the considerations or judgment. In the
Hippocratic school o f medicine, illness was the result o f natural causes, rather than
"divine retribution, the invasion of demons, or the disturbance o f evil spirits."* Rational
reasoning based in observation of the senses was the primary tool o f diagnosis. As
revolutionary as this was in the movement o f medicine from a mystic practice to a
scientific process, it was also the beginning o f what was to grow into a chasm o f silence
between patient and physician, breaking their relationship in two, separating the
fundamental interrelationship and interdependence between healer and patient. For these
reasons, the Oath can be criticized as justification for paternalistic practices in medicine,
in particular a lack of meaningful communication between physician and patient.*
As the Western world moved into the medieval era, much o f the practice of Western
medicine was done by religious clerics of the Catholic Church dedicated to the service o f
the sick and caring for the great numbers o f wounded from various religious wars, most
notably the Crusades. Cleric-physicians followed the tradition o f practitioners stemming
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from the Greek religious sect of Pythagorianism. The Hippocratic Oath continued as a
pledge of service to the sick for these Christian physicians. To be acceptable to the
Church the Oath needed only minor revisions, such as the exclusion o f references
pledging loyalty to goddesses and gods.
Following the Oath's pledges, conversations between these cleric-physicians and their
patients were no more open than in ancient times and primarily served the purpose o f
offering hope, comfort and reassurance. However, sometimes the only hope o f the
patient's survival required convincing the patient to endure the often crude, unpleasant
treatments and medicines of the time. Such an objective required an emphasis on the
need of the physician to be authoritative or even manipulative, because without respect
for medical authority and so adherence to its prescriptions, there often was little chance of
recovery.
During this period, interactions between physicians and patients were shaped by three
beliefs, stemming primarily from the association o f the practice o f medicine with the
clergy of the Church. These beliefs were that: patients must honor physicians because as
clerics they received their authority from God; patients must have faith in their physicians
because as clerics they are the servants o f God, therefore faith in cleric-physicians reflects
their faith in God; and, patients must promise to follow the prescriptions of their
physicians as they would follow the laws o f the Church because they come from God's
servants.’ Under this religious influence, medical practitioners and the lay public alike
developed the idea that, in matters of their practice, the physician's authority was absolute
because it was God-given. Although service remained part of the role of physicians, the
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authority of the physician took on another dimension o f importance. This shaped the way
in which patients and physicians related. Physicians were eventually seen as having
authority over patients, and patients were seen as having a duty to be faithful in obeying
that authority. Thus, within this context the importance o f physician-patient dialogue or
shared participatory decisionmaking was not considered.

Earlv Western Medical Ethics
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries secular ethical theories and philosophy
began to influence the practice of medicine. Yet the impact on patient-physician
relationships and respect for patients as sentient beings remained at the fringes o f medical
practice. The new scientific methods for investigation in the natural sciences and its
reliance on reproducible evidence were taking hold in many areas of scientific research.
Applying the new science to medicine meant that causes o f illness and the effectiveness
of their treatments could be more reliably proven and reproduced, making the practice of
medicine more certain than in the past. Claims o f objectivity and reproducible scientific
research outcomes were viewed as a means o f legitimizing scientific medical practices
and exposing non-scientific practitioners as charlatans who did not have similarly
reproducible foundations for their claims of successes. Thus, scientific medical practice
claimed itself as more reliable than other methods o f practice.
In 1772 Dr. John Gregory wrote about the moral purpose of medicine as the
preservation of the patient's best interest through "...preserving health...prolonging life
and curing diseases."* Gregory loosely supported a moral obligation of the physician in
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truth-telling, but did not go so far as to endorse emerging political ideas regarding the
balance and conflict between paternalistic beneficence and personal autonomy.
Physicians were still viewed as the appropriate authority on patients’ best interests.
Ultimately, Gregory's ethics did little to further the participatory decisionmaking of
patients in their own healthcare. Rather, he continued support for traditional physician
beneficence over patient autonomy, based in part on new claims of expanding esoteric
knowledge of physicians.
Early in the nineteenth century Thomas Percival's book on medical ethics became
another foundation for Western physician ethics. However, it focused on ethics in health
care from the perspective o f physician relations with hospitals and other healthcare
professionals, and dealt primarily with social etiquettes. He supported this idea that the
preferences of the patient were not to be harshly opposed. He did so not because patients
deserved respect as sentient beings or because patients had the right to make their
preferences known. Rather, he did so out of considerations for therapeutic outcomes.
Nineteenth century physicians held essentially holistic beliefs in the importance of
involvement of the whole person for therapeutic healing. The modem era o f medicine as
a scientific practice, concerned primarily with the functioning and disfunctioning o f the
body resulting from illness and injury, had not yet taken complete hold. Similarly, the
concept of mind-body dualism, in which mind and body are viewed as disconnected and
functioning separately, was not yet part of medicine. For Percival and his colleagues, a
person's mental state could directly affect physical well-being, and thus the patient's
treatment preferences should be considered. Since behaviors such as ignoring or
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overriding the wishes of the patient could create fear, anxiety, resentment, or anger, and
these emotions were recognized as detrimental to recovery, such behaviors were not
advocated. However, Percival’s ethics continued to follow the traditional thinking that
physicians should be ministers of hope and comfort to the sick, and so urged restraint in
making grim prognostications regardless o f knowledge to the contrary.’ Although he
acknowledged the patient's right to know the truth about an illness, Percival argued that
the physician's obligations to benefit the patient superseded that right. So he too
ultimately supported what was claimed to be the physician's appropriate authority of
benevolent deception in patient-physician interactions, information and best interests
decisions.
Shortly thereafter the newly formed American Medical Association (AMA) published
its first Code o f Ethics in 1847. It was unmistakably similar to Percival's and remained
largely paternalistic, supporting physician authority and beneficent deception in treatment
decisions even after several r e v i s i o n s . T h u s , regardless o f holistic approaches to mindbody interactions in illness, what was rapidly becoming an institutionalized practice of
medicine sanctioned the notion of physician authority in the name o f beneficence
concerning patients’ best interests. In supporting this notion of authority as appropriate
in the role o f physicians interacting with patients, the AMA sanctioned physician power
over patients in their determinations of when to adhere to patient preferences, when to lie
to patients, and when to manipulate or withhold the truth. In this way, physicians placed
themselves at the center of relationships with patients, unilaterally controlling interactions
and decisions. The importance of patient involvement in decisions concerning their own
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body, tied to self integrity, remained outside the purview and practice of medicine.
There were a few scattered instances of evidence that a rudimentary notion o f
informed consent existed prior to the mid-twentieth century. Two physicians o f the
nineteenth century, Worthington Hooker and Richard Cabot, have been cited as isolated
individuals who fought against the practice o f beneficent deception. Neither, however,
recognized informed consent as obtaining the patient's permission or respect for the
patient's autonomy. Rather, it was considered merely expedient to disclose truth to a
patient regarding the patient's illness." Thus, physician authority in the name o f
beneficence continued to control the power in relationships and interactions with patients.
The art of healing, a practice which requires the knowledge and energies of both patient
and practitioner working toward the mutually understood best interest o f the patient,
remained outside the practice of medicine.

Modem-Era Political-Philosophical Influences
Late in the seventeenth century liberal political philosophy with its emphasis on
individual rights and freedoms was beginning to gain prominence the Western world.
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke are two of the early writers credited with promoting the
concepts of individual rights and of social contracts as the basis of the formation o f
governments. According to Hobbes, it is the human characteristic of reason which allows
for the social contract o f agreement for order among those within a society.”
Governments are formed in order to protect the mutual rights o f all its individual
members and punish those who would infringe upon the rights o f others. It is from the
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social contract that the secular morality of a society emerges. According to Locke,
natural rights such as life, liberty and property belong to all persons and are not given up
to a government.” Rather, only the right to judge and punish infractions o f the social
order is given up to the government. Locke's theories o f fundamental rights of
individuals and contract ethics provided the new United States and other nations with an
ethico-political framework for the development o f such documents as the Declaration o f
Independence and the Bill o f Rights. It was also clearly a source of influence on the
acceptance, furtherance and elevation o f notions o f rationality and impartiality as the
hallmarks of liberal rights which later played instrumentally in the development of
contemporary U. S. Bioethics.
Nearly a century later, Immanuel Kant laid the foundation for the concept of
autonomy which was much later applied to medical contexts.” According to Kant,
morality is motivated by duty. He viewed morality as rules or laws which, as in nature,
are universal to all rational beings. He argued that what is right or wrong in a particular
situation can be determined by eliciting the maxim or principle o f an action and asking
whether it can be consistently willed in universal adjudication. This requires that every
person be regarded as an end, not as a means, and all o f mankind as a community o f ends.
Kant also argued that freedom is an indispensable basis for morality. Free will, as a
requirement o f practical reason, is implicit in the moral judgment that a person could
have acted otherwise, and without it one could not be blamed for one's action. The idea
Kant formulates is that o f autonomy, that is to say moral law is imposed by the practical
reason (will) of rational beings. This contrasts morality based on desires o f human beings

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40
rather than religious command. Thus Kant's conception of autonomy is a kind o f selfdetermination in which self-will, as practical reason, both creates the moral law and
chooses an action out of a rational respect for that moral law. Kant's autonomous agent
must be motivated by duty to the moral law, completely untainted by personal
inclinations such as self-interest, pursuit of happiness, love of another, sympathy or
emotional reaction. It is the view of the solitary and isolated self-actualized individual. It
is a view o f the self that can be criticized as the view from nowhere because it is a self
who is not situated within a context. Still, the profound influence o f the application of
interpretations o f Kant’s autonomous person and actions in the development of
contemporary ethical theory regarding informed consent and decisionmaking caimot be
overestimated. It is the interpretation and application o f Kantian notions o f autonomy in
contemporary medical ethics context that has been at the heart of emerging problems in
judgments by physicians of patients’ autonomy for informed consent and medical
decisionmaking. This is likely due to codification o f informed consent and an
expectation that clinicians interpret a philosophical concept for which they are ill
prepared and about which they have conflicting interests.
In the nineteenth century John Stuart Mill wrote his political essay. On Liberty, which
is considered a classic philosophical source for antipatemalism in the state and for
medical ethics as well.” Mill argues that only when harm is caused to another is there
legitimate grounds for intervention with a person's autonomous choices and actions.
Unfortunately, Mill has not had quite as great an influence on physician interactions with
patient decisionmaking as Kant. Further, like Kant's theory o f autonomy. Mill’s concept
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of noninterference applied to the medical context also requires that healthcare
professionals interpret the autonomous choices and actions of patients. So it presents a
similar problem in the judgment of another’s autonomy for the purposes of
decisionmaking.
The works o f Locke, Kant, Mill and others greatly influenced the development of
American liberal politics. Individual rights and freedoms gained importance in the
emerging new government and shaped its foundational documents, the Declaration of
Independence, the United States Constitution and the Bill o f Rights. These documents
further influenced the development and popularity in the U. S. o f such concepts as
rationality, individual autonomy and self-determination, which were later applied within
the context o f medical decisions. The concepts, although originally conceived in
reference to the political state, also had significant influence in the development and
dominance o f the most prominent principles o f medical ethics. Under such influence, in
philosophical debates between the principles of beneficence, usually understood as
traditional paternalism, and autonomy, usually understood as self-determination,
autonomy was given primacy. Thus it followed in medical ethics that autonomy of the
individual became a primary consideration and served as the foundation for the
development o f legal recognition of a right to self-determination in medical treatment,
and establishes the importance of informed consent in assertion o f that right.

U.S. Judicial Influences
The importance and relevance of these political principles to the U. S. medical ethos
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was reinforced in the courts as patients challenged the authority o f physicians with the
authority of self-determination. Beginning in the 1890s, U. S. courts were faced with
cases brought by patients who claimed to be the victims o f involuntary surgery. These
claims were different from earlier cases in that they not only charged the physician with
malpractice but also with battery, based on the right to privacy and against unwanted
touching. In this way, the courts were drawn into the beneficence/patemalism versus
autonomy/self-determination debate. The judgments ultimately reflected the growing
political sentiments of the primacy of autonomy and self-determination to the lay public
as applied to medical interactions. In 1914 the decision against the defendant in
SchloendorfF v. Societv of New York Hospital included the statement by New York
Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cordozzo that "...every human being o f adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what should be done to his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault...."'* This
case is often cited as the precedent for charges o f battery against physicians in cases
where consent, usually for a specific surgery or procedure, was not explicitly obtained.
Judge Cordozzo's statement is often quoted in affirming the absolute necessity of
obtaining the patient’s explicit consent prior to any major, non-emergent medical
intervention. Herein is the beginning of the emergence o f the legal doctrine of informed
consent, and the legal recognition and importance o f the right o f self-determination.
Until the mid-twentieth century, the courts usually regarded self-determination in the
requirement o f consent as consisting of the patient's agreement to a proposed invasive
procedure, usually surgery. Most often this was accomplished by the physician telling
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the patient what was proposed and why, usually in a manner that would virtually
guarantee patient agreement with the plan. Because o f this, what was called consent
could more accurately be understood as assent. Considerations of what the patient should
know in order to agree had not been defined. Salgo v. Leland Stanford. Jr.. University
Board o f Trustees in 1957 was the first case to apply the additional requirement and
emphasize the importance of specific information regarding potential risks as an essential
element of medical consent. It was in this case that the phrase "informed consent" was
first used.'* The court further stated that any discretion used in the disclosure of potential
risks based on the assessment of the patient's mental and emotional state must be
consistent with full disclosure o f the facts necessary to make an informed consent. Thus
the courts were starting to define the extent and kind o f information necessary for
assertion of the right of self-determination in healthcare decisionmaking.
Shortly thereafter, in 1960, the decision in Natanson v. Kline further defined
disclosure of information as the necessity o f revealing treatment hazards that should be
reasonably known to all physicians. This became known as the "reasonable doctor"
standard. The standard was redefined in 1972 in Canterburv v. Spense to include the
necessity of revealing risks that an unidentified but universal, reasonable person would
want to know. Although this created problems in determining who this reasonable person
was and exactly what he or she would want to know, nonetheless this case moved the
emphasis of who should be the one judging the kind o f information needed for
decisionmaking from the physician to the patient, and became known as the "reasonable
patient" standard. Thus the philosophical principle o f respect for autonomy was
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developing considerable weight due to progressive support in the emerging legal doctrine
which required a specifically defined notion o f informed consent. The courts further
articulated the legal rights o f privacy, protection firom unwanted touching, and selfdetermination as the right to make informed decisions regarding one’s own body within
the context of medical treatment.*’ As the reasonable patient standard governing the
kind and amount of information necessary for informed consent moved into rights
language, the focus changed from kinds and amounts o f information, to an individual’s
right to information, any and virtually all information, based on the requirements o f the
individual asserting the right.
Despite the progressive assertion o f self-determination in early theoretical medical
ethics and the law, physician clinical practices and attitudes remained paternalistic
regarding information and claimed beneficence in interactions with their patients. A
study by Louis Harris, et al., in 1982 demonstrates an inconsistency between the legal and
theoretical doctrine of informed consent and actual physician practices and understanding
o f informed consent. The overall impression conveyed by this sur/ey is that while
physicians reported seeking patient consent, they had something quite different in mind
than an autonomous act by the patient. In their survey, the authors reported that in
answer to the question, "What does the term informed consent mean to you?" only 26%
o f the physicians queried indicated that informed consent had anything to do with a
patient giving permission, consenting or agreeing to treatment. In addition, only 9%
indicated that it involved the patient making a choice or stating a preference about
treatment options. The overwhelming majority of these physicians appeared to recognize
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only the information-giving component of informed consent, or the duty o f disclosure.
They viewed informed consent as explaining the nature o f the condition and treatment so
that the patient understands what is or will be taking place.'* To these physicians,
informed consent means only telling things to patients, not asking anything, such as
permission. Based on this kind o f evidence, it would seem that as late as 1982 all that
was understood by many physicians about informed consent was that the patient's
signature was required on a "consent" form after some kind o f disclosure had been made,
rather than any meaningful exercise o f informed choice. It would also seem that the legal
underpinnings of informed consent in the duty to disclose relevant information, rather
than the philosophical underpinnings o f respect for a patient’s self-determination, had a
more substantial influence on the actual practice of informed consent in medicine.
This points to an ongoing and pervasive inconsistency in the practices and attitudes of
physicians with the formal medical and public acceptance o f the importance o f informed
consent. The basis of this inconsistency lies in the paternalistic notions that the physician
could know what is in the best interests of the patient without consulting the patient, and
that claims of beneficence could justify overriding the patient’s view of best interest if it
did not coincide with the medical view o f the patient’s best interest. The notion that this
disregard for the patient’s self knowledge is not beneficence but a kind o f rationalization
for imposing the medical view as absolute power ever patients who seek care and
treatment is not understood. This imposition goes beyond confidence in one’s expertise
and esoteric knowledge and clearly disregards the essence o f medicine as a healing art.
The art requires humanistic skills beyond esoteric knowledge and use o f tools. It requires
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an interplay between healer and patient, including the knowledge, energies and
interdependence of both. It requires building mutual trust, understanding and respect.
Finally, it requires recognition and acknowledgement o f one’s own humanity in the other.
None of these are evident in claims of paternalistic beneficence. Indeed, such claims are
essentially antithetical to a healing art.

Western Social. Technological and Scientific Influences
Alongside the development of liberal political concepts of individual autonomy and
self-determination and their applications in medical contexts, came the developments of
science and technology. During the Industrial Revolution technological advancements
were closely followed by significant scientific breakthroughs, which often resulted in
more technology. The discipline of medicine made progress in improved diagnostic and
treatment measures and soon came to place a much higher value on the empirical science
of medicine over what had previously been considered the healing arts. As medicine
mirrored the values of U. S. industrial society, and as technology and science made
medical "miracles" possible, the earlier Greek and medieval notions of the humanistic art
of healing fell by the wayside. By the mid-twentieth century the scientific and
technological paradigm which now pervades every aspect of our daily lives had become
firmly rooted in U. S. society. As medicine took on the dual powers o f science and
technology, physicians moved farther and farther from the bedside and the patient.
Similarly, as the influence of the legal system increased, the U. S. public became
enamored with rules o f conduct, individualism, and laws governing relationships and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47
behaviors.
The development o f contemporary U. S. medical and biomedical ethics with its
particular emphasis on autonomy, self-determination and informed consent is often traced
directly to the post-World War II era. Following the Second World War, as evidence and
testimony revealed the details of Nazi doctors' experimentation on their prisoners, the
U. S. together with its Western allies began to consider the ethical aspects o f medical
research and experimentation on human subjects. The Nuremberg Code o f 1946 created
an international voice regarding the importance o f the patient's agreement to medical
interventions, particularly medical experimentation.
This Code, a result of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal's deliberations in the case of
the United States v. Karl Brandt, et al., is a ten point statement of permissible conditions
for medical research on human subjects. It begins, "The voluntary consent of the human
subject is absolutely essential."” The Code specifically advocates that the subject should
have legal capacity to consent; should be able to exercise free power o f choice "...without
the intervention of any element o f force, fraud, deceit, duress, ...or other ulterior form of
constraint or coercion...;" and should have sufficient knowledge and understanding of the
information regarding the elements o f the research in order to make "...an understanding
and enlightened decision." The detail of the information necessary for this type of
decision entails,
...the nature, duration, and purpose o f the experiment; the method and means by which
it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the
effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in
the experiment.’®
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Responsibility for determining the quality o f the subject's consent is also clearly assigned
to the researcher. Thus, the Code sets the stage for the formal adoption o f what is
currently considered the necessary elements o f medical research informed consent.
In 1962 the first Declaration of Helsinki was developed and adopted by the
Eighteenth World Medical Assembly at Helsinki, Finland. Their purpose was to reaffirm
the importance o f ethical considerations and protection of human subjects in medical
research.”

Revised in 1975, the Declaration explicitly addresses the importance o f the

researcher's responsibility in assessing predictable risks and benefits to the subjects o f the
research, and in abstaining from research where the risks are found to outweigh the
benefits. Information regarding the "aims, methods, anticipated benefits and potential
hazards of the study and the discomfort it may entail" must be part of each subject's
consent to participation. In addition, the researcher is expected to inform the subject that
he or she is free to not participate in the study, or free to withdraw at any time. The
researcher is advised to be particularly cautious regarding the subject's consent if the
subject is in a situation or under duress that could influence the free nature o f the consent.
The Declaration also requires that researchers recognize those who do not have capacity
for consent, and, if they are to be included in the study, must provide for them to receive
the same information and obtain consent through a legal guardian or authorized relative.
At the 1966 Armual Convention of the American Medical Association (AMA) the
House of Delegates formally adopted the ethical principles endorsed in the first
Declaration o f Helsinki in 1964.- The guidelines the AMA subsequently published for
its members enlarged upon those in the Nuremberg Code and the 1964 Declaration of
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Helsinki. In 1974 the AMA was asked to establish procedures for the protection o f the
rights o f those potential research subjects who were mentally incapacitated and
institutionalized. The AMA House o f Delegates reaffirmed the 1966 guidelines,
emphasized the ethical responsibility o f the researcher, endorsed the principle that the
rights o f those subjects whose ability to consent is impaired must be protected, and
affirmed the goal of establishing international uniform standards and procedures,
including informed consent, for medical research.
Several specific events in technological development and medical research in the
United States increased the acceptance by the public o f the importance o f informed
consent. These technological achievements included the developments o f artificial
ventilation techniques for acute respiratory failure in the 1950s; hemodialysis for renal
failure, with methods o f patient selection by committee for its limited availability in the
early 1960s; the initiation of organ transplant surgery with kidney transplants in the
1960s, and later, heart transplants in 1969.
However, in addition to these technological advancements, the 1960s marked the
beginning of public awareness of research consent violations with the uncovering of
significant omissions of consent in medical research within the United States. The postWorld War II activities o f the United States and other countries had resulted in the
codification of world-wide agreement on ethical behavior for medical researchers through
the Nuremberg Code and later the Declaration of Helsinki. But the actual behavior of
medical researchers regarding informed consent was not aligned with these expectations
o f ethical researcher conduct. What was revealed, and continues to be revealed, can be
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considered a pervasive disregard for these codes o f ethical behavior by researchers in
practice. Henry Knowles Beecher, a professor at Harvard Medical School, has been
widely acclaimed as having taken the lead in investigating and exposing the actual
practices of medical researchers. He published a groundbreaking article in 1966 and
subsequent book in 1972 on his analysis o f researcher practices regarding informed
consent o f their subjects. He cited twenty two examples o f researcher misconduct in
risking the health and/or life of their subjects, without informing them of the dangers of
the experiments or obtaining their permission through informed consent. Beecher
concluded that unethical or substantially questionable conduct among researchers was not
uncommon. Further, he noted that these breeches of conduct were not limited to private
institutions or funding programs, but also occurred in prestigious medical schools,
government military departments, the Veteran's Administration Hospitals, and federal
agencies such as the National Institutes of Health.”
One of the first of these incidents occurred at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital in
New York. A research project initiated in 1960s was conducted at the hospital in which
twenty-two patients were injected with live cancer cells. The objective of the study was
to determine whether the cause o f a decline in the body's inability to reject the
transplanted cells was due to the cancer cells or to the patient's debilitation. Patients
without cancer were needed for the study. Some of the patients were informed verbally
that they were involved in a medical experiment, but they were not told that they were to
be injected with cancer cells. No written consents were obtained, and some of the
subjects were incapable o f giving consent. The incident was eventually brought to court
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and the participants were found guilty o f fraud, deceit and unprofessional conduct.”
Another incident of disregard for codes o f ethics in medical research in the United
States occurred in New York at Willowbrook State School, a state run institution for
children with mental disabilities. A series of experimentations began in 1956 with the
objective of developing an effective prophylactic agent for infectious hepatitis. The
researchers deliberately infected patients with strains o f hepatitis after consents were
obtained from parents of the children under circumstances that may have been
manipulative. Although the experiments were eventually disclosed in 1972, closure on
the debate over the ethics of the research was never achieved.”
One of the most well known cases o f blatant disregard for research ethics was that of
the Tuskegee syphilis study. The Public Health Services initiated a study in the 1930s to
compare the effects on health and longevity of untreated syphilitic persons with
nonsyphilitic, otherwise similar persons. The subjects were all African American males
who did not know the name or type o f their disease. They were only told that they were
receiving free treatments for "bad blood," a term that was allegedly assumed by the white
physicians a euphemism for syphilis. One of the most compelling elements o f the
situation was that the research was repeatedly reviewed by Public Health Services
officials and medical societies, reported as articles thirteen times in respected medical and
public health journals, and yet continued without challenge until 1970. Once revealed as
a concern regarding research consent ethics, the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare appointed a panel to investigate the policies and procedures for department
protection of human subjects. What the panel concluded was that no governmental
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agency had an adequate policy for reviewing research procedures or for securing the
consent of subjects.”
As a result o f these exposures, and their profound effect on the public consciousness
regarding ethical issues and behaviors in medical research and clinical practice, interest in
the ethical implications o f the applications of medical technology and research grew. The
Hastings Center and the Kennedy Institute were started in 1969 and 1970 respectively.
Their primary purpose was to provide a forum for discussions which the founders hoped
would bring moral clarity into the complex, confusing and conflictual situations created
by the advances in medical science, and to examine the ethical and moral implications o f
rapidly expanding medical technologies. Both o f these centers remain actively involved
in the on-going dialogue regarding these issues today. Discussion and debate
surrounding informed consent, surrogate descisionmaking, considerations of family and
community, and the appropriate role of healthcare professionals remain central issues in
U. S. medical ethics today.
As the twentieth century closes, evidence that a scientific ethic in medical treatment
and disregard o f patient preferences by physicians continues and is pervasive has been
recently documented in the SUPPORT study. This four year study focused on physicianpatient communication, frequency of aggressive treatment, characteristics of hospital
deaths, and related interventions for specific outcomes. The results o f this study
demonstrated that the structured interventions designed to change physician behaviors in
these areas through improved communication were, for many reasons, ineffective in all
areas of focus.” The published report on these outcomes shocked much of the lay public.
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yet confirmed the anecdotal suspicions and experiences o f many healthcare practitioners.

U.S. Regulatory and Legislative Influences
In addition to professional discussions and examination of these issues within think
tank organizations, the federal government also got involved. Congress passed the
National Research Act and established the National Conunission for the Protection o f
Human Subjects o f Biomedical and Behavioral Research in 1974. This Commission's
task was to devise ways to protect the rights and welfare o f human subjects o f research,
and to study the ethical principles that should govern biomedical research. The
commission was specifically directed to consider
the boundaries between biomedical and behavioral research and the accepted and
routine practice o f medicine; the role of assessment o f risk-benefit criteria in the
determination o f the appropriateness of research involving human subjects; the
appropriate guidelines for the selection of human subjects for participation in such
research and the nature and definition of informed consent in various research
settings.”
The commission produced the Belmont Report which applied the ethical principles o f
respect for autonomy, beneficence and justice to biomedical and behavioral research. It
represented the first official governmental analysis o f the ethical principles that underlie
medical science and medical decisions from the standpoint of a secular, nonprofessional
body.
Following the conclusion of the National Commission, the President's Commission
on the Study o f Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
was appointed in 1980. Its mandate was broader and included issues about care o f the
dying, genetics, decisionmaking, informed consent, and the allocation of scarce
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healthcare resources. The Commission produced multiple reports, considered by some to
be the standard for secular medical ethics, with three volumes devoted to issues
surrounding healthcare decisionmaking and informed consent.”

These volumes argued

that although the history o f informed consent emerged primarily from law, its
requirements are essentially moral and policy oriented. It further argued that informed
consent is based on a principle that competent persons are entitled to make their own
decisions from their own values and goals. Thus, for a consent to be valid it must be
derived from an active, shared decisionmaking process between the physician and the
patient. The Commission described the principle o f self-determination as the foundation
of its viewpoint. It seems clear that the viewpoint of the Commission and that of
physicians reflected in the Harris study were not just inconsistent, but coming from
opposing views, one focusing primarily on patients and their involvement in
decisionmaking, and one focusing primarily on physicians and their legal liability.
By 1990 the combined effects of the published works by these two Commissions,
heightened awareness concerning individual freedoms and publicity surrounding legal
cases resulted in public recognition and wide support for the rights of patients to make
their own healthcare treatment decisions. These rights were recognized not only in the
present situation of patients, but for an unforeseen yet possible future as well. This
growing perspective included that healthcare providers should recognize and uphold
those decisions.
The Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA), passed as part o f the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) o f 1990, became effective in December, 1991. The passage
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of this bill by Congress was influenced in part by the Supreme Court decision in the
Cruzan case and the national publicity surrounding it.’® In Cruzan, the family o f Nancy
Cruzan, a young woman who remained in persistent vegetative state (PVS) for several
years following a car accident, requested that her physicians discontinue the tube feedings
that provided life-sustaining treatment for Nancy. The family maintained that she would
not have wanted to live in a PVS condition for the unknown remainder of her life. The
physicians and the institution refused to comply based on the position that to do so would
cause her death, and since she was unable to communicate in any way, there was no
means to obtain her direct agreement. Through the publicity o f the anguish of the family
in the circumstances o f the case, the Cruzan family brought into focus the plight o f
persons who no longer have the mental capacity to make their own healthcare decisions,
and thus could be subjected to sustained medical treatment they may not have wanted.
The case also brought to public light the reality of contemporary medicine's capabilities
to prolong biological life without the likelihood of recovery or return to previous
function. Although not entirely unique in itself, the case fueled public interest in medical
decisionmaking because it exemplified what many persons felt was a fate they would not
want to suffer themselves.
The PSDA was passed with the intention to empower individuals to take part in the
medical decisions that affect the duration and condition o f their lives. Its sponsors.
Senators John C. Danforth and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, wanted to correct what was
perceived to be an imbalance of power in healthcare decisionmaking and clarify the
relationship between patients and healthcare providers regarding who was the proper
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decisionmaker. According to Senator Danforth, this imbalance had swung toward
"neglecting the caring component o f medicine and trampling on the rights of patients."”
This statement reflects a growing concern on the part o f the public that the direction o f
contemporary medicine and its providers had left too far behind the therapeutic healing
relationship once an intrinsic part o f the art of medicine.
Passage of the PSDA did not end the problems with physician recognition and
support o f the self-determined healthcare decisions o f patients as was intended. The four
year SUPPORT study has recently demonstrated that in reality many patients in
healthcare institutions experience their last few days o f life at the hands of practitioners
who do not know their patients' preferences and do not adhere to the details of those
preferences when they are known, and spend much o f their last few days on mechanical
ventilation, comatose, or in significant pain.
There have been many analyses o f the results of the study from different perspectives.
However, one of the problems that is central to the intent o f the PSDA is that of
constructing a legal or regulatory answer to what is in essence a moral problem. What
the PSDA intended and mandated through Advance Directives was to enable individuals
to prospectively direct their own future healthcare when facing end of life medical care in
the event that they are incapacitated to do so at that time. This kind of event, in which a
person is facing one's own death, treated with medical science and technology that they
would not choose but is unable to voice one's preferences to stop, is a deep fear o f many
individuals, fueled by the situations of Nancy Cruzan and many others. Another intent o f
the PSDA was to give formal recognition to the philosophical concept of the expression
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of a person's autonomy through the act of self-determination. This recognition seemed
most important in the context of healthcare where one's preferences concerning life,
death, bodily invasions and medical authority seem to converge.
!l was assumed that the way to best support individual preferences and change the
paternalistic habits o f clinical medical practice was to require practitioners to honor these
preferences through legislative action. However, as the SUPPORT study demonstrated,
the mere act o f signing an advance directive, or communicating preferences through a
proxy once unable to do so is insufficient and fails to capture the complex nature and
imbalance of power in healthcare interactions. It further exemplifies the difficulty in
trying to legislate what is essentially a moral problem within the practice of medicine.
The SUPPORT study sadly shows that the attitudes and behaviors of physicians in
medical practice in healthcare institutions has changed very little since the Harris study of
1982. As long as the profession o f medicine and all healthcare professionals do not view
their role and relationships with patients as derived from a humanistic art and related
skills, the moral problem of respect for persons as sentient, whole beings will continue.

A Cultural Influence
Contemporary U. S. medical ethics and its use o f principles developed under a
cultural influence as well. Albert Jonsen has suggested that an influence can be traced to
moral thinking rooted in the Calvinist-Augustinian traditions of early American settlers.”
That thinking deeply believes in clear, unambiguous moral principles, and in the
importance o f the observance of these principles for the common good. According to
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Jonsen, this particular culture viewed the world in antithetical categories, and sought
boundary systems and patterns of control that could hold moral order against the potential
of moral disorder. He argues that this morality survives today in dominant contemporary
U. S. culture to some extent, in form if not exactly in content. It has resulted in what
Jonsen calls "secular fundamentalism," that is, rules and principles for guiding right
actions which are strictly adhered to but no longer attached to orthodox religious rationale
and sanction. It is this thread of an early fundamentalist moral tradition in the historical
past that was subsequently adapted to the use o f secular philosophical principles and
applied in the context of healthcare decisionmaking and the use of medicine.
The notion that moral principles could be used as guiding rules, combined with a
liberal political ideal of individual autonomy and medical-legal events, has had
significant influence on the struggle to define contemporary U. S. medical morality. As
this definition began to take shape, U. S. medical ethics developed into principlism.” In
moral systems utilizing multiple rules for conduct, an informal hierarchical order emerges
when those rules are in conflict. It is the same with principlism in medical ethics. The
principle o f respect for autonomy, articulated as self-determination and informed consent,
was elevated to the position of primacy which it now holds in healthcare decisionmaking.
This primacy served to institutionalize a philosophical view o f the autonomous individual
that was claimed to be a universal value. Autonomy, as interpreted in predominant
contemporary bioethics literature, became a particular standard by which all patients were
judged by healthcare professionals regarding their capacity for decisionmaking, and
which all patients were assumed to value. The consequences o f institutionalizing such a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59

particularized view o f values within the context o f personal healthcare decisionmaking
has led to the kinds o f problems with informed consent presented in Chapter 1.

Conclusions
Early conceptions o f a medical ethos concerning a proper relationship and interaction
between patient and physician held the notion that the physician was bound by an oath of
duty to serve the needs of patients in the patients' best interests. Medicine was a healing
art, and as such, required the combined knowledge, skills and energies of both patient and
physician. Although the notion o f informed consent was not a part o f that ethos, neither
were patients disregarded as passive participants in or recipients of the healing process
and the use of medicine. The therapeutic effects of the powerful healing forces o f nature
within the patient were well acknowledged and respected.” Yet even as the art o f healing
in early medicine engaged the physician and patient together, the physician's oath and its
application in practice were also the earliest sources of what was to become a chasm of
silence in and within the relationship between patient and physician.
As early Hippocratic physicians gave way to Christian cleric-physicians, the role of
the physician gradually took on the dimension of divine authority, linking clericphysicians as servants o f God with the authority of God. This authority set physicians
apart from patients and strongly reinforced paternalistic beneficence as the guiding
principle for physician attitudes and behaviors in interactions with patients. As scientific
knowledge in medicine advanced, the art of healing was left behind in favor of the
presumed superiority of science. At the same time the silence grew, fed by increasing
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esoteric knowledge and a paternalistic belief in deceptive beneficence.
As Western liberal political ideas influenced the public conceptions of the individual,
self and liberty, the application o f these conceptions in the context o f medicine was
inevitable. Advances in science and technology and their impact on the practice of
medicine pushed the humanistic skills of the healer further and further into the
background. This myopic view o f the application o f the new medicine needed
counterbalancing in order to preserve and protect the interests o f those whose bodies and
lives were affected by scientific medicine. While physicians took on the claimed
objectivity and authority o f science, the lay public embraced the political philosophical
notions of liberal individualism and the accompanying legal rights. These rights asserted
self-determination as a basic interest o f liberty and led to the demand for the participation
o f patients in decisions regarding their ovm healthcare. That demand in turn led to
growing legal support for what was considered a necessary element for patient
participation in healthcare decisionmaking, the notion o f informed consent. Thus, the
concept of informed consent developed in the practice o f healthcare and medicine as an
integral part of moral reflections on the nature o f medical treatment, patients' rights and
the appropriate role of physicians.
As the Western world in the twentieth century witnessed the kinds of human
denigration caused by immoral medical research conducted without restraint or respect
for its subjects, attempts to control this kind of drive for knowledge were sought through
several regulatory efforts. Although these regulations were publicly endorsed by the
U. S. government and the AMA, the actual practices o f medical researchers revealed a
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blatant disregard for them. This research was not only conducted and supported by
private interests but by governmental and public healthcare institutions as well.
Revelations of these breeches in the conduct of ethical medical research further eroded
public trust in the ability o f the medical profession to regulate itself and in the authority
o f the professional role of physicians as experts in patient-physician interactions and
decisions. However, additional legislative actions aimed at correcting imbalances in
power between physicians and patients have had limited success in changing the attitudes
and behaviors o f physicians toward the self-determination decisions o f patients.
Because of these failures by the medical profession to recognize, acknowledge and act
on the importance of the patient-physician relationship beyond that of the beneficent and
expert authority, the public responded through their Congressional representatives by
appointing two federal commissions. These commissions were charged with the
responsibility o f studying the ethical dimensions o f medicine and biomedical research
for the protection o f human subjects, and of assisting patients in asserting their moral and
legal rights concerning their own healthcare. It was from these studies in the application
o f moral principles in the healthcare context that the principle o f respect for the autonomy
o f others gained prominence over that of physician beneficence in healthcare
decisionmaking. However, it was the codification o f the philosophical concept of the
autonomous individual, intended to free the hold o f paternalism over patients in the use of
medical treatment, that also served to further the distance and silence between patients
and healthcare professionals. As discussed earlier, even the codification o f the principle
did not significantly change the attitudes and behaviors o f physicians regarding Self-
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determination of patients. In fact, it served to move the focus o f physicians away from
the interdependence of relationship with the patient to the fulfillment o f legal
requirements and a duty o f disclosure. Once again, the patient was, and remains, largely
and essentially lost to medicine as particular and central in the relationship. Once again,
the art of medicine remains elusive.
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CHAPTER 3
AUTONOMY IN HEALTHCARE DECISIONMAKING:
A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

Thus far it has been established that informed consent in medicine is a relatively
recent phenomenon. Informed consent was not a major issue in medicine until the mid
twentieth century, even though earlier threads can be found. It has also been established
that several external factors from both public and private sectors contributed to its
emergence. Finally, it has been shown how dimensions of its meaning are based on
philosophical and legal underpinnings.
Throughout the brief historical survey of U. S. medical ethics and informed consent
presented in Chapter 2, the concept o f respect for autonomy, understood as selfdetermination within the legal doctrine, emerged as the underlying ethical assumption of
greatest importance. Because o f this prominence, now paradigmatic in scope, the concept
requires a closer examination as most prominently represented in contemporary moral
philosophy generally, and U. S. bioethics literature specifically. The process is intended
to provide an understanding o f a definition of autonomy, including its assumptions, that
has formed the basis of ethical considerations in healthcare decisionmaking in order to
understand more fully how its impact in application has unintentionally resulted in the
kinds o f problems noted in Chapter 1.

67
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The concept o f respect for autonomy as a moral principle and as represented in
contemporary U. S. bioethics literature has to do with a particular view of the self and is
grounded in both political and philosophical theories. It is a notion that weaves together
other concepts such as rights, duties, actions and personal freedom. The word autonomy
is usually understood within a personal, non-political context as self-directed freedom,
particularly moral independence. It is the most frequently mentioned moral principle in
contemporary U. S. bioethics literature on informed consent. The concept o f autonomy
stems from a philosophical grounding in "the liberal Western tradition of the importance
of individual freedom and choice" ' in both political and personal life.
The political and moral theory o f American liberal individualism, founded to a great
extent on the writings of Locke, Kant and Mill as noted in Chapter 2, views individual
autonomy as a fundamental value and a basic right concerning individual freedoms. As
stated in the Encyclopedia of Bioethics. "The basis for an action, social practice, or
government policy to be [considered] right or good is in the values, practices or choices
of autonomous persons."* This view promotes the idea o f autonomous persons as the
ultimate source o f a society's values.
Yet autonomy as an ultimate value and fundamental right is not undisputed and may
be considered by some to be in conflict with other equally or more important values. For
example, the autonomy of individuals may be viewed as in conflict or tension with a
perspective of moral authority stemming from community or family-centered values: a
view o f complete disclosure to a patient regarding terminal illness as cruel and
burdensome and therefore more appropriate for the family than for the patient; a spiritual
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view of one's relationship to the Universe that shuns thinking or talking o f bad things as
dangerous to the well-being of a person's harmonious existence in and relationship to the
Universe; or a view that a spouse's interests may at extreme times supersede the wishes of
the patient regarding death. All of these perspectives could be viewed as potentially
conflicting with a claim of primacy for individual autonomy. Similarly, in a healthcare
institutional setting, the autonomy of individual patients may be viewed as in conflict or
tension with other commonly held values of healthcare professionals, such the duty of
beneficence or that of justice.
Thus in developing an understanding of autonomy it must be understood that
autonomy as it is constructed and accepted in current U. S. bioethics and informed
consent laws represents a set o f values inherent in its assumptions. Because autonomy is
a constructed view of the self, the values promoted by this construction are values which
are primarily personal and individual. These values are supported and promoted through
the application o f the concept to a particular context, in this case, informed consent. But
it must be understood that these values represent one particular view, and are not
universally held or held as highly as they are in this view.
This chapter will examine the dimensions o f a construction of autonomy that have
contributed to the development of informed consent as currently practiced. These
dimensions are both philosophical and legal. Although they can be separated in
explicating an understanding of autonomy, they are really intermingled in the
applications in terms of rights, duties, agency and actions.
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Autonomy as Rights and Duties
The concept of autonomy as the foundation o f informed consent in healthcare
decisions is based in two different but mutually supportive frameworks, moral
philosophy and law. Traditionally, individual autonomy from a moral philosophy
perspective is grounded in "a principle of respect fo r [the] autonomy [of another] that
focuses on the [individual] patient...who has a right to make an autonomous choice."^
Individual autonomy from a law perspective, on the other hand, is grounded in a duty of
actions for one that directly corresponds to the right of the other. "Although the patient
[has] a right to consent or refuse, the focus [in tort law] is on the physician who holds a
duty and who risks liability by failure to fulfill the duty."'*
Similarly, a distinction can be drawn between being autonomous, that is, possessing
certain capacities which are understood to define an autonomous person, and being
respected as autonomous. For one to respect another as autonomous is "to recognize with
due appreciation that person's capacities and perspectives, including his or her right to
hold certain views, to make certain choices, and to take certain actions based on personal
values and beliefs."^ So if understood as a moral demand or rule for action to respect
persons as autonomous beings, the concept can be restated in moral philosophical terms
as a principle, that of respect for the autonomy of others. This moral principle or rule,
then, provides the basis for the claims o f individuals to the right to make autonomous
decisions. Thus, from a moral right a correlative moral duty arises. As Faden and
Beauchamp explain in A Historv and Theorv of Informed Consent. "A right always
entails the imposition of a duty on others either not to interfere or to provide something.
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both the [moral] duty and the [moral] right being justified by the same overarching
principle."*
The right of privacy, considered the legal counterpart to the philosophical moral right
o f autonomy, can be understood in legal expression o f the duty o f respect for the selfdetermination of others. Although not explicitly stated in the Bill o f Rights, the right of
privacy is generally thought to arise out of the First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Law loosely relies in part on the moral philosophy o f its society to delineate rights and
duties, and from them legal liability, in both case and statutory law. Thus, a similar
correlation of rights and duties appears in law as in moral philosophy. In the case of
informed consent, the patient has the right to information and to make a personal choice,
and the physician, primarily, has the correlative duty to give information and honor the
patient's choice. Consequently, the physician, and sometimes other healthcare
professionals, may be held legally responsible (liable) for violating the patient's right.
This may occur either by failing to fulfill the duty of obtaining the patient’s consent, or
by failing to provide adequate and relevant information in a manner understandable to the
patient.^

Autonomy as Agencv and Actions
In contemporary moral philosophy as found in much of the prominent bioethics
literature, personal autonomy, or the autonomous self, is usually understood as personal
self-governance or self-determination. This understanding or definition carries with it
certain requirements necessary to meet the definition, such as "adequate understanding of
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relevant information while remaining free from controlling interferences by others and
from personal limitations that prevent choice."* Thus, the autonomous self, as defined,
entails possession o f certain psychological capacities that usually include at least agency,
independence, sometimes rationality, and various other capacities.
Moral agency is often understood as an awareness o f oneself as having desires,
intentions or plans, and acting on them so as to accomplish or satisfy them.’ It has been
suggested that this capacity for agency is what distinguishes humans from non-humans.
Non-humans may have desires, but lack "the capacity for self-consciousness that is
manifest in having awareness o f desires and their effect in actions

However, this is

not to say that agency necessarily requires that one is never influenced by either internal
(conscious or subconscious) or external forces or factors. Rather, it accounts for how
persons are capable of acting through their own choice, not how they actually or always
act.
Moral independence, also called voluntariness, can be understood as the absence of
overwhelming or controlling influences on the moral agent. These are the kinds o f
influences that come as a result of external manipulation or coercion by others, and may
directly and profoundly affect or alter a person's beliefs, life plans, values or actions.
Within this understanding a person under such influences is believed to have little or no
capacity to act autonomously. Moral independence, as understood here, also usually
requires that a person have a range of options. Thus, as coercion and manipulation by
others may work to defeat autonomy, so may social and physical environments or forces
which artificially constmct limits on a person's options for actions."
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Moral rationality, rational decisionmaking or means-end rationality is a more
controversial element of autonomy, depending on its definition and use. It is less
controversial when understood simply as the capacity for reflecting on one's view of the
good together with one's life plans to achieve the good. As such, rationality is choosing
actions based on the best possibility for fulfillment o f that view. It has been suggested
that those who lack this capacity for rationality include those who are severely mentally
ill, such as persons with schizophrenia or psychopathology.‘* It might also include
persons who are comatose, in persistent vegetative states or under extreme influence of
dmgs as when under anesthesia. Rationality as one o f the necessary elements or required
psychological capacities of autonomous persons is sometimes considered controversial
because judgments of the rationality of the decisions o f another are tied to beliefs and
values. So there is a tendency to judge another's decisions or actions as rational or
irrational in comparison to one's own beliefs or values, which are not necessarily those of
the decisionmaker.'^ Furthermore, it has been argued that both rationality and
irrationality function within the normal as well as abnormal psychology of individuals,
and so should not be viewed as either healthy or pathological respectively.'■*
Personal autonomy or the autonomous self is often discussed in terms o f describing a
person (agent) and describing that person's actions. The autonomous person or self may
be described as having the ability to reflect upon and adopt attitudes toward one's own
view o f the good and corresponding life plans regarding actions for the achievement of
that view.'* For example, a person may choose to identify with their life desires,
inclinations, values and preferences, or may instead choose to change them if they do not
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reflect the kind of person one desires to be. This can be articulated another way as the
concept of having the power of, or capacity for self-determination. Thus autonomous
actions can be understood as those actions o f a person that demonstrate the individual’s
overall capacity to reflect on one's value preferences, to alter them if desired at least in
part because one has reflected on them, and then to make them effective through a course
of deliberative actions. Gerald Dworkin has argued that "...exercising such capacity, we
define our nature, give meaning and coherence to our lives, and take responsibility for the
kind of person we are.'"* Similarly, Stanley Benn has described an ideal of the
autonomous person as,
the one...whose life has a consistency that derives from a coherent [self-chosen] set of
beliefs, values, and principles, by which his actions are govemed...The principles by
which the autonomous man governs his life make his decisions consistent and
intelligible to him as his own; for they constitute the personality he recognizes as the
one he has made his own."
Such descriptions conceive of an autonomous person as consistent, independent, resistant
to control by others especially those in positions of authority over one, and the source of
one’s own choices regarding basic values, beliefs and actions.
Unfortunately, in contemporary moral philosophy and contemporary U. S. bioethics
literature specifically, there is no universally agreed upon representation of the definitive
characteristics of the autonomous person and autonomous actions. As previously noted
and Faden and Beauchamp explain, “The capacity to act autonomously is distinct from
acting autonomously, and possession o f the capacity is no guarantee that an autonomous
choice has been or will be made.”'* For example, in healthcare informed consent, if a
person fails to understand the relevant information given the choice made cannot be said
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to be truly autonomous. However, that the choice is non-autonomous may have less to do
with the person’s capacity for autonomous decisionmaking and more to do with the
inadequacies of the disclosure o f information. Thus within the context of autonomy as
defined a person may be autonomous and therefore qualified to give informed consent,
but the consent itself may not be a truly autonomous act due to various influences such as
inadequate or poorly explained complex information, family pressures or other social
responsibilities.
In contemporary moral philosophy there have been two dominant models of personal
autonomy." The freedom model, that is, autonomy as personal freedom to act, focuses
on describing the circumstances surrounding an action, including a decision or choice,
and can be characterized by the writings of Inunanuel Kant. In A Historv and Theorv of
Informed Consent. Faden and Beauchamp suggest a variation of the freedom model for
informed consent in which there are three specific elements, or conditions, that define
autonomous actions, including decisions. They suggest that a decision or choice is
autonomous if and only if that action is done, "intentionally, with substantial
understanding, and without [external] controlling influences.”-* (This model does not
include internal controlling influences, as others previously noted do.) In addition, they
suggest that all three of these conditions are necessary for a decision (action) to be
considered autonomous.
In this model, intentionality is not a variable or a matter o f degree. An action is either
intended or it is not intended. However, according to these authors the other two
conditions, understanding and absence of external controlling influences, can be satisfied
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to a greater or lesser degree.-' In this construction the concept o f personal autonomy can
be understood as if along a continuum from fully autonomous actions to fully
nonautonomous actions, depending on the degree of satisfaction o f the two variable
conditions. This model allows for some actions to be considered substantially
autonomous, although not fully autonomous, when there is a condition o f substantial
understanding but not complete understanding, and/or some controlling influence but not
completely controlling influence. The threshold above which actions or decisions are
treated as autonomous and below which are treated as nonautonomous is, the authors
admit, a subjective interpretation. Likewise the term "substantial understanding" is also
subject to interpretation and not further defined by the authors.
The fact that these terms are subjective and open to individual interpretation is
problematic in terms of applicability of the model in the clinical setting by those who are
usually charged with this responsibility but not trained in moral philosophy or medical
ethics. Healthcare professionals, particularly physicians, are expected to assess the
decisional capacity o f patients whenever healthcare decisions need to be made. Yet most
medical schools do not train physicians to make these kinds o f assessments based on an
understanding of moral philosophical concepts of informed consent and autonomous
persons and actions. When decisions have significant outcomes at stake, such as
potentially life-altering or life-threatening outcomes, the weight o f the decision is viewed
as greater and therefore the assessment more crucial. However, frequently the question
regarding a patient's autonomous decisional capacity arises only when the patient's
decision is not aligned with the medical point of view. When a patient refuses a
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recommended medical treatment or procedure that is expected to have a significant
beneficial outcome from the medical perspective, even if it has unavoidable risks
attached, the patient's capacity is questioned even if that capacity had not been questioned
previously. Healthcare professionals fi-equently assume that such a refusal must imply
that the patient either does not have sufficient information, or does not sufficiently
comprehend the relevant information disclosed. This is clearly a medically biased view.
Consider, for example, the case In re Quackenbush. Mr. Quackenbush was a 72 year
old man who refused to have his gangrenous legs amputated. It was noted by his
physicians that his conversation wandered occasionally, but not substantially greater than
what might be expected as normal for his age. He had avoided seeking medical treatment
for over forty years. He was neither in a terminal condition nor comatose. If he had the
amputations he would live indefinitely, but not having the amputations would lead to his
death. After examination by the judge the court determined that "the state's interest in
preservation of life is not sufficiently compelling to override Mr. Quackenbush's right of
privacy to decide competently his own future 'regardless of the absence o f a dim
prognosis.'"-- This determination supports that a prognostic indicator o f outcome is
insufficient reason to forcibly treat patients. Yet, as this case demonstrates, when a
patient refuses a recommended procedure with a prognostic outcome viewed by medical
bias as beneficial, the patient's decisional capacity is often judged by healthcare
professionals as impaired. This kind o f situation occurs frequently within healthcare
institutions where patients are acutely ill or chronically dependent and at greater risk for
abuse by medical power and authority.
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Similarly, if a patient refuses a recommended treatment or procedure considered of
significant benefit to the patient and decisional capacity is not in question, then external
sources of manipulation become suspect. Healthcare professionals who observe a close
relationship between the patient and another may view the relationship as manipulative or
coercive if the perspective of the other person seems contrary to that o f the proposed
procedure and the other appears to have influence on the patient. This suspicion is the
source o f conflictual tension between a patient's significant other and professional staff.
Because the current model of informed consent is based on an individualistic view of
persons rather than a relational view, the profile of the individual is the focus and others
are added to that profile only tangentially. From this view others can only be seen as
having potentially competing interests to those o f the individual. This is precisely the
starting point for the development of tensions between healthcare professionals and
families as in the cases of Mrs. B and Mrs. M presented in Chapter 1. These tensions
clearly arise out of the assumptions o f the autonomy model o f informed consent. But
these assumptions regarding the autonomous individual, especially when threatened with
illness, impairment or death, do not fit with intuitions regarding patients and their
relations with close others. Furthermore, healthcare decisions often do have a dramatic
impact on these others and it is remiss not to acknowledge the moral weight of their
interests.-* Yet to merely recognize and acknowledge these interests is insufficient
because in so doing the view of competing interests is sustained.** The limitations of this
autonomy model as the paradigm o f informed consent regarding the influence and role of
relational others in healthcare decisionmaking are made even more dramatic when
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professional assessments are compromised by a lack o f understanding concerning the
complexities o f relationships and their appropriate role in the decisions o f individuals.
The suspicions of healthcare professionals are not necessarily completely wrong or
improper and frequently are an appropriate source o f discomfort that may trigger a closer
interaction with the patient to determine unclear or subtle aspects of the patient's
decisional process. But even closer interaction with the patient may only yield further
doubt of the patient's capacities if done so from the perspective of medical bias inherent
in the profession of medicine. Without a significant understanding o f the intent o f
informed consent and its basis in moral philosophy applied to the medical context,
medical professionals are likely to assess the variables of patients' capacities for
understanding and amount of external influence at a threshold unrealistically high. These
assessments are of particular importance when considered from the perspective o f the
unequal power within the relationship between professionals and patients. The intent of
informed consent in healthcare decisionmaking is necessarily based on a dyadic,
interdependent relationship between patient and professional; the professional possesses
specialized knowledge essential to an informed choice, and the patient possesses the
personal knowledge of self essential to appropriate use o f medical treatment.** Without
this basic understanding and the appropriate skills for developing and nurturing their
relationship, professionals on all levels and in all areas of expertise are not qualified to
make the assessments for which they are responsible.
The authenticity model, that is, autonomy as “one’s own” actions, beliefs, character
and motivations, focuses on describing the person, and has been utilized by Gerald

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80

Dworkin and Stanley Benn, as previously noted. A variation o f the authenticity model of
personal autonomy in healthcare decisionmaking was proposed by Jay Katz in 1984.**
He suggests that the contemporary debate over personal autonomy for a patient's selfdetermination and healthcare informed consent has been fought over two issues: rights
versus capacities (agency). Katz defines autonomy not as a legal and moral right of
autonomy or o f self-determination, but as psychological autonomy which denotes the
capacities (agency) o f persons to exercise the right of self-determination. In other words,
according to Katz, autonomy suggests a person's capacities to reflect about contemplated
choices and to make decisions based on those reflections. Moreover, it emphasizes
psychological and mental capacities rather than quasi-legal rights.
According to Katz personal autonomy or the autonomous self, defined in terms o f
psychological autonomy and its constraints, encompasses both conscious and
unconscious motivations. It takes into account an ideational system within a person's
psyche that can exercise motivating forces without being consciously accessed, and so
must acknowledge and pay attention to the potential for conflict between conscious and
unconscious motivations. Accordingly, all thoughts and actions are influenced by the
simultaneous operation of conscious and unconscious forces with both rational and
irrational components. Thus, in assessing the rationality of another's decisions, if
assumed a necessary element in healthcare decisionmaking o f autonomous persons, it is
essential such assessment be based not only on an understanding o f the patient's thinking
in relation to his or her worldview and values, but also on a scrutiny by both health
professional and patient of the significance to one's own view o f the other's rationality.
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Katz believes that in using this approach it may turn out that what is perceived to be an
expression o f a patient's irrational decision is actually based on different value
preferences about the importance of longevity, quality o f life, bodily invasions or risks
worth taking. Furthermore, he cautions that rational and irrational should not be
construed to mean healthy and pathological, respectively. Rather, he suggests they work
hand in hand in both normal and abnormal psychological functioning o f all humans. He
argues that respect for another's personal autonomy or autonomous self, that is, the
psychological or mental capacity to choose among options based on one's own values,
beliefs and world view or view o f the self, demands respectful, open conversation
between health professional and patient that allows for personal perspectives which may
appear irrational to someone with differing values and world view. Katz argues that the
ultimate decision should belong to the patient who has to live with the decision.
The authenticity model has not gained the support and widespread use o f the freedom
model because it is more interactive, relational and conversational and relies on selfawareness and self-reflection o f both professionals and patients, viewing their
relationship as interdependent. Furthermore, it dismantles a simplistic notion of
rationality and irrationality as oppositional indicators o f mental health and decisional
capacity. Thus, the authenticity model requires skills and knowledge that are not part of
the scientific medical educational process and therefore uncomfortable to most healthcare
professionals who are unfamiliar with them. It might also be more difficult to regulate
this model. However, it is a model that is more closely aligned with the intent o f the
concept of informed consent as conceived in its philosophical grounding. It is also a
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model that allows for a variety of considerations as legitimate in the process o f healthcare
decisionmaking that would not be so in the freedom model. If it were more widely used
regulatory provisions and litigation cases might be less necessary. Therefore, the
authenticity model is more appropriate for affecting a condition o f informed consent in
the healthcare context.

Autonomy and Informed Consent
The issue of informed consent is complex and involves ethics, law and cultural
influences. The concept in medical, legal, philosophical, regulatory and medical ethics
literature has been generally understood and defined in terms o f certain elements
considered fundamental to that concept. These elements are primarily derived from the
dominant conceptions o f autonomy as previously described in terms o f capacities of the
agent (agency) and elements of the actions of the agent. Informed consent as commonly
understood in U. S. bioethics includes such notions as: knowledge and comprehension of
relevant information, reflection on one's choices regarding a decision to act (decide),
voluntariness of action or the absence of internal and external controlling constraints,
ability to make a choice or decision, and making such a choice or decision known.*’
Various interpretations o f this understanding generally agree on these elements as
necessary for a condition o f informed consent, and differ only in which if not all of the
elements are necessary in any given situation.
This conception of informed consent has been criticized as a distortion based on
traditional medical conventions and authority, focused on the duty o f disclosure of
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relevant information and legal liability o f professionals rather than on the meaning and
intent o f informed consent as an expression o f a patient's autonomous decisionmaking.**
This criticism asserts that there is nothing in the nature o f the concept o f informed
consent that necessarily requires disclosure o f information as part o f its meaning or as a
necessary element in the analysis o f its meaning. It is only in the interpretation of the
concept from a particular view that the necessity of disclosure arises. For example, a
person may possess information sufficient to make an autonomous decision without
additional disclosure or a person may hold the view that to speak o f potential risks creates
them in reality. So, to require disclosure as a critical element without regard for the
capacity or view of the particular agent is to misunderstand or misrepresent the intent of
the concept from a medico-legal bias.
In considering the question. What is informed consent? at least two generally
accepted meanings in medical ethics and the healthcare industry come to the fore. In one
sense, based on philosophical underpinnings and prominent in bioethics, informed
consent is understood as an autonomous decision or authorization (act) by a competent
person. That is to say, it is a voluntary or freely chosen, substantially understood,
intentional agreement to a proposed course of action.
In a second sense, based on legal underpinnings and prominent in the healthcare
industry, an informed consent is understood in terms of, “...cultural and policy rules of
consent that collectively form the social practice of informed consent in institutional
contexts... [for the purposes of treating] groups of patients or subjects....”*’ This definition
is more that o f an institutional consent which does not refer to any notion o f autonomy,
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but rather to a legal authorization by a patient or subject (as in research). This kind of
informed consent, the content o f which can and does vary to some extent by state as well
as by institution, is not necessarily an autonomous act nor is it necessarily meaningful as
an authorization per se. It is, however, the mainstream understanding of informed
consent found in federal, state and institutional regulations o f patient authorizations for
treatment. Its requirements do not focus on the autonomy o f the agent or the act of giving
consent, but rather on "regulating the behavior of the consent-seeker and on establishing
procedures and rules for the context of consent."**
This model is also the primary understanding o f informed consent in the minds of
many healthcare professionals as disclosed in perhaps the largest national survey of
physicians' attitudes and understanding regarding informed consent. As noted earlier, the
results of this survey demonstrated that while physicians report seeking patient consent,
they have something quite different in mind than an autonomous act, or voluntary
informed choice by the patient. In their survey, the authors report that in answer to the
question "What does the term informed consent mean to you?" only 26% of the
physicians queried indicated that informed consent had anything to do with a patient
giving permission, consenting or agreeing to treatment; and a meager 9% indicated that it
involved the patient making a choice or stating a preference about treatment options.*'
The overwhelming majority of these physicians appeared to recognize only the
information-giving component of informed consent, that is, the duty aspect o f disclosure,
viewing informed consent as explaining the nature of the condition and treatment so that
the patient understands what is or will be taking place. To these physicians, informed
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consent means only telling things to patients, not asking anything, such as pennission. It
seems that what is understood by many physicians about informed consent is that the
patient's signature is required on a "consent" form after some kind o f disclosure has been
made, rather than any meaningful exercise o f informed choice as an autonomous act by
the patient. It would also seem that the legal underpinnings of informed consent in the
duty o f disclosure, rather than the philosophical underpinnings of respect for others'
autonomy, has had a more substantial influence on the actual practice o f informed
consent in medicine.
These two constructions of informed consent, the philosophically based autonomous
agent's act and the legally based requirement o f a signature, are both understood in
contemporary U. S. medical and biomedical ethics literature but provide a somewhat
confusing picture of what informed consent is meant to be. The first model, based
primarily in the philosophical understanding o f autonomy, can fail to be informed consent
as understood by the institutional or legal model, as for example if there is a lack of
conformity to rules (e.g. the patient must be an adult or legally emancipated minor, must
not be under the influence of mind-altering medications, must be legally competent to
give consent, etc.) and requirements (disclosure must include risks and benefits a
reasonable person would want to know). At the same time, the legal model o f informed
consent, based in regulatory provisions, similarly may not yield an informed consent as
understood by the philosophical model, that is, an autonomous authorization for and
agreement to a proposed procedure.
It has been argued, however, that these two constructions of informed consent need
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not be mutually exclusive.** They can be used together so that the first model becomes a
condition, or a moral "benchmark," for the purpose o f assessing the adequacy o f
informed consent framed for the institutional context. Thus, it may be argued that it is
possible to align the social intention o f informed consent, that is, enhancement of
autonomous decisionmaking, with the legal requirements currently necessary within the
institutional context.

Conclusions
This constructed understanding o f autonomy and how it supports informed consent
for healthcare decisionmaking is representative o f the conventionally held view o f
autonomy, healthcare decisionmaking and informed consent that dominates contemporary
U. S. medicine and medical ethics. The discussion has demonstrated that this conception
of autonomy is rooted in philosophical traditions o f liberal politics that highly value a
kind of abstract individualism. The view of the self in this understanding is one of a
solitary, independent, self-sufficient and self-actualizing individual. Its theoretical base
favors a hierarchical ordering of various moral principles that give primacy to the
principle of respect for others' autonomy. Its legal base is committed to personal liberty
and the duty of others to respect that liberty.
The use of this conception as a model for informed consent has considerable
limitations. For example, it requires an assessment o f a patient's capacities for
decisionmaking based on substantially subjective criteria such as understanding and
influence by persons poorly prepared for that kind of assessment. This easily leads to a
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subjective interpretation o f another’s decisions based on one's own values rather than on
those of the decisionmaker. The imbalance o f power and authority in the patientphysician relationship adds to the difficulty o f an accurate assessment. The model only
marginally recognizes interpersonal relationships and other types of social contexts, such
as religious affiliations, ethnic traditions, or responsibilities to others insofar as these are
viewed rather negatively, that is, as potential constraints, competing interests or
controlling influences on an individual's autonomous acts. Furthermore, it misses the
intention of informed consent, that o f supporting the process o f healthcare
decisionmaking in order to enhance the autonomy of individuals' lives.
The conventional view has had a strong hold on the domain of U. S. bioethical
theory, teaching and practice. It has served an important and useful purpose in early
articulation of some of the difficult and conflicting issues at play within the context of
increasingly complex medical science and technology. However, more recently this
tradition is coming under considerable scrutiny, based on critical examination o f its
assumptions and the experience of clinical bioethicists in the trenches. It is becoming
apparent that the role of autonomy in informed consent and healthcare decisionmaking as
currently represented in U. S. bioethics literature may assume too much about the way
many persons go about personal healthcare decisionmaking. It may also assume too little
about the substantive role played by others in close relationship to the patient and the
importance of other social contexts within which most humans live and die. As
demonstrated by the examples in Chapter 1, it is becoming ever more apparent that the
dominance of a notion o f autonomy in healtlrcare decisionmaking may not be adequate
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for many individuals in our society whose world view may not value as highly the
concept o f individualism, or for whom relationship carries a more fundamental and
influential role in their lives.
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CHAPTER 4
CHALLENGING THE PARADIGM

Chapters 2 and 3 have outlined the development and subsequent defining of the
prevailing approach to healthcare decisionmaking, particularly informed consent, in U. S.
bioethics. The primary considerations have included: the development o f informed
consent as a legal requirement in healthcare decisionmaking; the prominent role of
individual autonomy as a condition o f informed consent; and the role of surrogates for
individuals who do not possess those capacities, but who, nevertheless, retain the same
rights. This approach has dominated both bioethics theory and practice in the U. S. for at
least the past two decades. In fact, many healthcare professionals consider the principle
of respect for autonomy as paradigmatic for their relationships and interactions with
patients in healthcare decisionmaking situations.' This is especially so with end o f life
issues, as demonstrated by the problems presented in Chapter 1.
The discussion thus far has been largely a representation of U. S. bioethics theory as
found in most prominent texts and literature on the subject. It is a view that defines an
ideal of the self as essentially solitary, independent, self-governing, self-actualizing, and
free of controlling manipulation or constraint by others. This view focuses on rights and
duties of individuals. It views others as largely outside the self-interest rights of the
individual, and as having a duty to respect these same rights of all individuals. Thus,
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within this fiamework two mutually supportive moral mandates emerge regarding the
moral behavior o f the individual toward others and vice versa. Moral consideration o f the
individual by others is expected to entail respect for the autonomy o f the individual, and
protection o f that right on behalf of the individual who lacks the capacities for autonomy.
Moral consideration of others by the individual is primarily viewed as interactions
between equals, possessing the same rights as the individual and therefore deserving of
the same respect for those rights.
Chapter 1, demonstrated a recognition o f problems encountered in clinical contexts
regarding this principle of respect for the autonomy o f others in healthcare
decisionmaking and the role of informed consent in supporting that principle. These
problems are primarily due to a paradigmatic application o f this autonomy model, not
only as the philosophical base from which to consider approaches to bioethical problems,
but also as a process for decisionmaking and the role o f healthcare professionals in a
context that serves individuals from a great variety o f traditions, cultures, beliefs and
value systems. In this application of a singular perspective to both the content and the
process, the concept becomes too narrow and the process too confining. Thus, instead o f
respect for the autonomy of others being a point of liberating freedom to choose without
paternalistic interference as intended, the perspective becomes limited by the constraints
of its definition and legal requirements. In addition, the response to this singular model
of definition and process by healthcare professionals has been to view their role of
interaction with patients within the same constraints which further limits relationships
and interactions between them. Thus despite the significant contribution o f the field of
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U.S. bioethics to the consideration, discussion and education of the public and
professionals regarding ethical issues in medicine, the approach from a single perspective
has also contributed to its limitations, subsequent problems and criticisms.
This realization has resulted in questions regarding the adequacy of this autonomy
model and its view of the self and others as currently applied in healthcare and supported
in U.S. bioethical theory. Challenges to the autonomy model have come from many
different perspectives such as casuist, communitarian and utilitarian theories. The
challenge for bioethical theory presented here is to demonstrate the need to include a
process for consent and the role of healthcare professionals that is less constrained by
definition and more open to interaction than the current model without abandoning the
notion of autonomy altogether. This challenge is based in a relationship-centered care
model constructed primarily from what is generally known as an ethics of care.

Rights and Care
It may be helpful to begin with a comparison between a rights or individual-centered
perspective, and a care or relationship-centered perspective of morality and their
respective constructions o f the moral agent. In the rights or individual-centered model,
individual autonomy plays a prominent role and has two main dimensions: moral
autonomy and personal autonomy. Moral autonomy is a process o f moral
decisionmaking in a situation of conflicting rights. The moral agent uses skills of
deductive reasoning, described as detached reasoning or logic rationality, to discern
which in a set of assumed universally accepted moral principles ought to be followed in a
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particular moral circumstance. Personal autonomy is a right, or entitlement, to freely
pursue one's own visions of the good in one's own life and in one's own way. Moral
autonomy stems from an ideal of the rational individual who, acting within a social
contract model, upholds values found in a public market system. (Social contract theory
will be discussed under "Claims of Universality" later in this chapter). Personal
autonomy stems from an ideal o f individual liberty in a political philosophy o f liberal
individualism. Together they form a view o f the moral self based on autonomy rights
that it is individual-centered. As such, the rights recognized support the individual as the
moral authority over one's own life. At the same time, individuals are shielded from
potentially intrusive moral demands o f others and authority of the state which could
infringe on an individual's pursuit o f a personal view o f a good life.
These rights and their corresponding duties to respect the same rights of others are
designed to support freely choosing individuals in their liberty right to express their
autonomous choices, so long as they do not unduly impinge on the rights o f others, since
'the good' is accepted as a matter of personal interpretation. Therefore it can be
understood that "rights secure for the individual an arena o f personal liberty."*
Development of the moral self is marked by such characteristics as: independence, or
separation from dependence on others; fairness, or public justice; and impartiality, or
recognizing the claims and duties o f others as equal to oneself. Moral conflicts arise
within this understanding when rights of individuals conflict, or when one's moral duty
conflicts with the rights o f another.
A care or relationship-centered model of morality, on the other hand, is "an alternate
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set of moral concerns where the central concern is a responsiveness to others that dictates
providing care, preventing harm and maintaining relationships."^ In contrast to
hierarchical ordering o f moral values characteristic o f the individual rights perspective
and its primary positioning of respect for others' autonomy, Gilligan has described an
ethics of care as based in a "network o f connection, a web o f relationships that is
sustained by a process o f com m u n icatio n .In this perspective, moral problems do not
result from a conflict o f rights between equals adjudicated by ranking assumed
universally accepted values or moral principles. Rather, moral problems emerge from
conflicting responsibilities within a specifically contextual framework o f the relevant
participants. Moral deliberations are "contextual and narrative rather than formal and
abstract."^ Thus moral decisionmaking in a paradigm o f care does not require a deductive
reasoning process o f weighing universal, competing principles and then applying the
outcome to a particular situation and particular individuals. Rather, it requires a more
fluid strategy that aims at maintaining and supporting relationships to the extent possible
without sacrificing one's own integrity.® In an ethics o f care, personal integrity entails
honest self-reflection regarding one's own needs, feelings and attitudes and taking
responsibility for them by attending to them in relation to an ideal o f caring for others.^
This perspective recognizes the interdependence o f self and other, so that "the concept of
identity expands to include the experience of interconnection."* Within this perspective,
the development o f the moral self is characterized by an individual who freely chooses
relationships with others based on caring attitudes, who has an increasing understanding
and valuing of human relationships, and who strives to attend to the needs of relational
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others while maintaining one’s own integrity and caring for one’s self.
A morality based in care and relationships has theoretical precedents in early Greek
philosophy and other theories. Aristotle and Hume are predominantly the two who have
been frequently cited as offering theoretical grounding for a care-based morality.
According to Aristotle, moral deliberations require cultivation o f a moral character. This
cultivation is the development of certain virtues and skills into habits that guide actions
and interactions with others. These include discernment, deliberation, preservation of
integrity, temperance, pursuit of excellence and maintaining relationships. This character
development is on-going and occurs over a lifetime.
Aristotle taught that the capacity for moral judgment arises from the cultivated moral
character and attends to circumstance, relevant individuals and context. Moral action is
specific to the circumstances at hand and so requires details o f a situation to determine
the appropriate moral response. Thus, moral judgment does not rely on an abstract
concept of the good, or on rule based reason. It has to do with much more than following
or applying rules or doing one's duty. Aristotle taught that moral deliberation must
determine the right thing to do at the right time, in the right place, to the right person and
in the right way.
According to Aristotle, caring is a moral behavior that arises out o f a desire to make
the object o f caring as good as possible. Moral actions o f caring entail those aimed at the
achievement of this good. However, there is no single definition o f good. This is
because perceptions of all things are based on the individual experience of being. So
definitions of the good are contextual and determining moral actions must allow for
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relevant contingencies that influence one's deliberations about those actions. Further,
Aristotle stressed the social embeddedness o f human beings and so the importance of
sustaining relationships’
Hume asserted that the concept of morals implies a sentiment shared by all or nearly
all human beings which allows for agreement on what is and is not acceptable in human
interaction. Further, it implies a similar sentiment regarding actions and behaviors which
cause general approval or disapproval in a society based on whether the actions are in
accordance with or deviate from what is acceptable. These two sentiments are what
Hume contended are required in defining human morality.”
Hume's argument that morality is grounded in emotion and personal concern
suggested that it is not rationality and reason that move us to act morally, but moral
sentiments or feelings which arise in situations that motivate us to act and so guide moral
life. This is not to say that reason plays no role in morality, but rather reason alone is not
sufficient to produce moral judgment. According to Hume, reason is used in assessing
the quality o f an action's effects in what is good. But sentiments define those virtues and
actions which are beneficial toward achieving the good. Hume also asserted that
morality was a universal characteristic of all or nearly all human beings, and only if one
rejected one's own human nature would one not share the experience o f sentiments. He
further argued that morality must serve not only the interests o f the society but also the
interests o f the individuals in that society. Therefore general rules for what is acceptable
must be open to exceptions in order to take into account relevant details of the
circumstance. Thus practical wisdom for moral judgment takes into account both reason
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and feelings. However, to Hume it is sentiments or feelings that are the greater necessity
for motivating moral deliberations and actions. He also argued for the importance of and
attention to relationships in considerations o f appropriate moral actions.
For both Aristotle and Hume, then, morality is more than a set o f rules agreed upon
by all and applied deductively to individual situations. Morality thus accommodates
general attitudes and behaviors of a society. But it also requires both the virtue of
feelings or sentiments that motivate one to act in order to achieve a good, and the skill o f
reason in order to assess the quality of benefit in choosing a course o f action. Morality
supports a society by offering a sense o f integrity, peace of mind and a satisfactory view
of conduct which are the sources for human happiness. Although morality can be found
in all human cultures, it must be contextual in order to pay due attention to the relevant
details o f a particular society's situation. This accounts for different views o f morality in
different cultures.
Central to a comparison between the perspectives o f rights and care is their respective
views o f morality and the self. Morality from the view of individual rights and deductive
reasoning begins with the self as a moral agent who is separate, independent from others,
and self-sufficient. This independent self freely chooses the moral path to follow in
situations o f moral conflict, ideally grounded in assumed universally accepted principles
governing moral actions. The moral choice will, optimally, infringe least on others' rights
while maximizing self interests. By contrast, morality from the view o f care and
relationship begins with a view of the self as situated within a network o f relations with
others that is marked by connection and interdependence. This in turn leads to moral
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deliberations which strive to maintain these relationships to the greatest extent possible.
From an individual rights perspective o f morality, the primary injunctions for the
moral self include noninterference, usually understood as respect for the rights o f
nonspecific others, and self-determination, usually understood as the pursuit o f one's own
perception o f good in one's own fieely chosen way. From a care perspective o f morality,
the primary injunctions for the moral self include giving care appropriate to a particular
other in response to self-defined needs o f that other, avoidance of harm by considering
the self-defined harms of the particular other, and maintaining or supporting
relationships, both one's own and those o f the other, to the extent possible while
maintaining one's own sense of integrity.

Claims of Universality: Self and Other
From the perspective of individual rights, abstract and universally applied principles
for guiding moral interactions with others can be identified as the rights to live one's own
life and to personal liberty to define that life, and the duties to respect the same rights of
others and to keep promises." These principles are derived from a theory o f a
hypothetical social contract and are viewed as universally appropriate for all rational or
potentially rational beings, i.e., all human beings. In a social contract theory interactions
between individuals are governed by a model o f behavior in which a group o f people
agree to a set of mutually acceptable principles of behavior to maintain social order. This
concept relies on the assumption that rational individuals who have both common and
opposing interests can agree to rules to arbitrate their disputes and facilitate their
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cooperation. Current notions of this theory accept that the social contract is not actual,
but rather hypothetical. Under this hypothetical agreement, rational people with the
responsibility for deciding moral and political principles o f a society would agree to
include these principles for acceptable behavior under market or fair bargaining
conditions. The idea of a social contract as a model for moral deliberations is to ensure
the rationality and impartiality of the principles people elect for use in social interactions.
While rational people would not agree to principles injurious to their own interests,
neither could they expect others to agree to principles injurious to theirs. It is therefore
just for individuals to comply with principles that are accepted by all under this
agreement for mutually beneficial reasons.
From this standpoint, then, the governing principles can be articulated relatively
easily as a formula, or algorithm, in which those on the receiving end o f the action are
viewed as variables that can be represented by virtually any individuals. When such
universal principles are applied and the variable individuals are inserted in a given
situation, an action imperative (principle) for the moral agent results. The reason for this
is that the principles governing moral action are universally applied and do not change
regardless of the individuals involved.
By contrast, the care perspective of morality does not usually accept such a deductive
and universal application of abstract principles to particular situations and concrete
persons.'- An injunction to give care in general can be considered essentially
meaningless unless one first considers the different kinds of situations in which one may
have a responsibility to care. From a rights perspective, too, it is important to consider
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particular situations in order to determine what rights and duties people have. However,
Giving care further requires attuning oneself to the needs and desires [as they define
them] that the recipients o f the caring conduct have in a given situation. At this level,
individuals must always be considered distinctive rather than typical, and decisions
must be made responsively rather than deductively.”
The distinction is that from a care perspective, unlike a rights perspective, the individual
that is the recipient of caring attention and action is o f central importance in determining
a moral action.
One challenge to the prevailing approach to healthcare decisionmaking and informed
consent and its views of autonomy and the self, focus on individual rights, and principled
approach to moral conflict resolution, is that it assumes a universality of what are claimed
androgynous values. This assumption is predicated on a view o f all individuals as
essentially the same rational beings, and as such all having the same rights, duties and
values in relation to other rational individuals. Benhabib has interpreted this standpoint
in what she calls the 'generalized' other. She points out that in assuming this view.
We assume that the other, like ourselves, is a being who has concrete needs, desires,
and affects, but what constitutes moral dignity is not what differentiates us from each
other, but rather what we, as speaking and acting rational agents, have in common.
Our relation to the other is governed by the norms o fformal equality and reciprocity.
each is entitled to expect and to assume from us what we can expect and assume from
him or her. The norms of our interactions are primarily public and institutional ones.”
Yet it can be argued that a rights perspective is far from androgynous, since it directly
arises from experiences in the public context, that is, economic and political realms, and
is grounded in a social contract model based on marketplace values.” This perspective
stereotypically reflects the social experiences and hence the values of men. Similarly, it
can be argued that a care perspective arises from social experiences in the personal
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context, that is, values of personal relationships and responsibilities o f care in relation to
family or close others. This perspective stereotypically reflects the experience and hence
the values o f women. This is not to suggest that either perspective accurately reflects an
exclusive domain of the gender from whose experience it arises. Rather, it is more likely
that the different perspectives reflect different experiences within society at large, and
that those experiences generally align with gender. Individuals in both genders can and
sometimes do share the perspective o f the other. As Gilligan has pointed out, different
ways o f knowing based in different perspectives and experiences represent different ways
of interpreting, valuing and viewing the self.”
Acknowledging these differing perspectives and the experiences that have given rise
to them creates questions about what has been viewed as universal and androgynous. It is
more likely that the autonomy model in bioethics has become dominant because it is the
ideology of the dominant group rather than a universal truth. For example, Harding
points out several significant parallels between the theories of feminine and African
world views which she attributes to a mutual experience, that of oppression.” According
to Harding, there is a tendency for both to affirm the difference of their respective groups
by distinguishing themselves from the dominating class o f the white European males.
Each group characterizes itself as being less interested in individual autonomy and much
more concerned with relations to others and to nature than are white European males.
Finally, both views are characterized by similar ontologies, epistemologies and
moralities.
These similarities point to three notions that illuminate causal aspects o f the
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correlated dichotomies. First is the notion that "the feminine and African world views
name what is absent in the thinking and social activities o f men and Europeans, that is,
what is relegated to 'others' to think, feel and do.'"* Second is the notion that the
increasing division o f labor between the conceptionalizers and the executors through
imperialism points to an additional aspect of the dichotomy o f relationship between
European and African labor on the one hand and male and female labor on the other.
"For reasons originating in an analysis of social relations, we should expect white,
bourgeois, European men to have cognitive styles and a world view that is different from
the cognitive styles and world views of those whose daily activities permit the direction
of social life by those men.'"’ As the struggles against imperialism and male dominance
move forward, those engaged in those struggles are conceptualizing their own labor and
experience counter to that of their oppressors. Thus, "we should expect differences in
cognitive styles and world views from peoples engaged in different kinds of social
activities. And we should expect similarities from peoples engaged in similar kinds of
social activities."-’
Third is the notion that developmental processes in infantile experiences play a
fundamental role accounting for these cross-cultural differences. Despite developmental
explanations for gendered world views that would seem to negate cross-cultural
similarities, the work of Isaac Balbus provides some insight into this idea. His
anthropological studies indicate it is likely that cultural variations in the intensity of
infant identity with the caretaker and the severity o f separation from that caretaker may
provide an explanation for how the Western male "infantile experience leads to one set of
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ontologies, ethics, and modes of knowledge seeking, while the infantile experience of the
[females and African males] tends to produce a different set."-' From these insights, she
suggests, one can see that a claim to the universality o f liberal individualism, its rights
and its values, begins to disintegrate.
Similarly, the theories that have dominated the U.S. bioethics domain concerning
healthcare decisionmaking have given priority to issues o f the public realm, such as
individual rights, individual autonomy and duties based on rules o f social contracts. This
has in turn given priority to a view o f others as abstract or generalized others. The other
is understood as a generalized self abstracted from specifics that form an individual's
identity as unique, such as the nature of one's personal relationships, spiritual beliefs,
ethnic traditions or socioeconomic status. It stems from an assumption of separation of
the self from others and the need for an external structure o f connection, a hypothetical
agreement to moral principles universally applied to all rational beings.”
In contrast is the notion of a 'concrete' other understood within the context of
particular personal and cultural history.” This view of the concrete other is a central
moral standpoint in a caring paradigm. It stems from an assumption that individuals are
essentially connected to others, such as families, culture and community. An underlying
motivation o f the caring moral agent is seeking an understanding of these particularities
in order to maintain and support essential connections important to the individual's selfidentity. Thus, the emphasis is placed on the active searching self rather than the passive
acceptive self.”
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Self and Other in A Healthcare Setting
It may be argued that the moral imperative o f care represents an ontology and
epistemology for a coherent moral perspective that is particularly relevant to the delivery
of healthcare in an institutional setting and as a moral ideal for healthcare professionals.
For example, in the cases o f Mrs. B and Mrs. M in Chapter 1, the healthcare professionals
were primarily concerned with the interpretation o f the autonomous rights o f the patients.
Their focus was on the fact that the patients had expressed certain desires regarding their
last days o f life. The spouses of the patients were viewed as peripheral to the patients and
generally outside the realm of their concem. In a care paradigm the focus widens so that
the patient is not only an individual person, but a person with a particular set o f
relationships, traditions and values that comprise the whole person. As such, the patient's
connections to those aspects of one's self are brought into the focus. As Gilligan has
observed, "The strength of the care perspective may lie in the refusal o f detachment and
depersonalization, and insistence on making [and keeping] connections that can lead to
seeing the person in their particular context, and as a person in real relationship with
others, as son, brother, father, etc."”
The two perspectives o f rights and care offer different assumptions regarding self and
others with differing views of human nature and the nature of the human condition. Their
respective appropriateness in the healthcare setting needs to be determined. One of the
main problems with the prevailing conceptions in U.S. bioethics literature and texts is
that, in general, this view neglects the particularities that constitute moral predicaments
typical o f the healthcare setting. It has little to offer when those involved do not share the
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values of individualism, autonomy and rights, or order these values differently from the
dominant culture or view. Beliefs and values which exemplify these situations were
presented in Chapter 1 including: beliefs that a spiritual force connects thoughts and
words with a capacity to affect reality, traditions that view veracity regarding illness as
burdensome and cruel to the patient and so more appropriate for the family to bear, and
notions that the interests of a spouse may sometimes take precedence over assumed
autonomous expressions of the patient. These views place a higher value on something
other than the autonomous choices o f individuals. The persons representative o f these
views were individual members of various communities, cultures and personal
relationships that had profound, formational influences in their lives and views. Hence it
seems clear that problems will emerge in healthcare from what has been assumed is a
principle that is universally accepted and applied with patients in a healthcare
institutional setting.
If one can accept that moral attitudes, values and corresponding behaviors arise
within "the context of the particular lives o f individuals that are embedded in particular
sorts o f relationships, then a theory o f ethics should attend to the nature of the
relationships that hold among those who are involved in situations requiring moral
deliberations."-® Our experience of relations with others can include immediate and
extended family, our community, spiritual beliefs or religious affiliations, social and
economic factors, racial and ethnic heritage, gender and, doubtless, many more. If our
sense of self is derived to a great extent from our experience of relations with others, then
a conception of the autonomous self that does not give due consideration to these
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interconnections between relevant others is likely grounded, at least in part, in an
impoverished view of the self.”
Yet, a contractual view o f the nature o f human relations dominates current U. S.
bioethical theory and practice and functions as a paradigm for relations between
healthcare professionals and patients. This view o f relationships has its centrality located
in a particular conception o f autonomous individuals, viewing those individuals as linked
to their relationships, traditions and values only by voluntaristic social ties which can be
opted out of if the individual chooses to do so. Beauchamp and Childress, prominent
authors and leaders in bioethical theory and defenders o f the primacy o f respect for
autonomous agents, have maintained that the prevailing notion o f autonomy does not at
all deny that community, traditions o f culture or ethnicity, and relationships provide the
grounding for moral development o f the self.” They further maintain that the prevailing
view is vulnerable to objections by relationship-centered theories only in the insistence
on the extent of respect due autonomous individuals. Thus they would seem to support
such notions as a relationship between healthcare professionals and patients as
appropriately based in a social contract model o f rights, duties, impartiality and
principles; a view of relations between individuals, including healthcare professionals, as
primarily voluntary, and that this adequately captures the most salient moral features of
such relationships; and a perception that this model also adequately captures aspects o f
individuals' traditions, cultures and social contingencies that are relevant to bioethical
contexts, such as healthcare decisionmaking and informed consent.”
Relationship-centered bioethical theory has argued that the prevailing view tends to
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assume "an idealized image o f the otherwise healthy [and autonomous] patient.... [which]
arises from a false conceptualization of individuals as capable of existing apart from any
social relationships....[and perpetuates a] mistaken vision of the isolated, self-sufficient
individual." This argument further suggests that the prevailing conception o f an
autonomous agent "fosters a misleading ideal o f the autonomous individual that
intensifies the already disadvantaged position o f ...[many persons] within the healthcare
systems."” The results of this distortion have had direct effects not only on patients but
also on those with whom they are in close relationship due to the construction of
standards for surrogate decisionmaking based on the autonomy model. Furthermore,
"this contractual picture of human relations dominates bioethical theory and functions as
a paradigm for relations between providers and patients."”
This discussion directly applies to situations of surviving spouses presented as
exemplar cases in the first chapter. Both o f these spouses were expected by the
healthcare professionals around them to step out of their specific relationships and
cultural traditions and acquiesce to assumed autonomous expressions o f their spouses. In
both situations the surviving spouses stood to personally suffer significantly if they
followed the behavioral norms of substituted judgment and best interests standards for
surrogate decisionmaking. In both situations their relationships with the professional
staff deteriorated when they did not adhere to the expected norms o f following the
assumed autonomous preferences of their spouses. In one of the situations where the
staff was highly technically oriented, the reactions o f the staff to the spouse o f the patient
may have even contributed further to her personal suffering. And in both situations the
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staff tended to see the behavior of the spouses as something other than moral, either as a
selfish motivation of personal preference or benefit or as irrational. Additionally, in the
two empirical studies regarding cultural perspectives o f traditional Navajo, KoreanAmericans, Mexican-Americans and the legal mandates concerning informed consent of
patients, the potential adverse effects on some members of distinctive cultural traditions
were readily revealed.

Considerations In Healthcare:
Professional Role Models
The question arising out of the preceding comparisons between the prevailing rights
based individual-centered model in U. S. bioethics and a care based relationship-centered
model is whether conceptions of the self, others and human relationships in their social
contexts supported in the dominant model are appropriate for the healthcare setting. In
answering this, it is important to first understand that how our view of the self influences
what counts as voluntary actions. Second, our view about relationships between
individuals and their social contexts will affect what may be considered available options
for voluntary actions. Considering both of these in the context o f the healthcare setting
will affect a conception of an appropriate role model for healthcare professionals.
A rights-centered social contract model in healthcare decisionmaking has had a
profound effect on how many healthcare professionals view their role in relation to
patients and relevant others in a critical decisionmaking situation. Due at least in part to
the paradigmatic application o f this model and its legal mandates concerning informed
consent, many professionals currently tend to focus on their role as patient advocate.
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They further tend to interpret this as supporting the individual patient's right o f selfdetermination and providing a voice for those who are not being duly heard. To an
extent, this may be an accurate role interpretation. It will likely remain a congenial
arrangement as long as the patient and close others agree to the expected norms of
decisionmaking o f this model based on fully informed consent, autonomously expressed
preferences made by the patient and support o f those preferences by relevant others.
However, in supporting these norms categorically as an understanding o f the
professional role in patient advocacy this model assumes that patients and their close
others accept the values o f liberal individualism and its conceptions of context-neutral
generalized others. It also assumes that patients and their close others can freely choose
to accept or reject specific elements o f the traditions and social contexts from which they
come and which have been internalized, embodied and have influenced their view of
self.^- Yet, any individual's sense of self may or may not include such notions of others
or available choices depending on the context of the individual's life. Social categories
such as gender, race, class privilege, and cultural traditions affect psychological, physical
and social experiences of every individual. In addition, where one finds oneself situated
in human life will likely affect many o f the opportunities available for individual choice.
Thus, an argument can be made that what counts as knowledge of human life is to a large
part derived from an individual's situated perspective.” As a result, it is understood that
these aspects o f human life play an important role in shaping one's identity and attitudes
concerning relationships with others, opportunities and choices for oneself. To the extent
that these perspectives are directly relevant to patients in the healthcare setting, they have
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direct bearing on the due considerations o f healthcare professionals in their understanding
o f their role in relations with patients.
The very nature of the context of healthcare would seem to point to a need to
reconsider an appropriate basis for healthcare professional roles. The highly personal,
intimate, often life-altering and sometimes life-threatening nature o f a healthcare
institutional acute care setting does not seem to be an appropriate context for assimilation
o f marketplace values of a social contract model among equals. Some patients may
largely maintain their usual autonomous (as understood in the prevailing definition) view
and approach to their circumstances while under the stresses o f illness, injury or other
debilitating circumstances. Others, however, have never held that view or approach or
are severely compromised by the circumstances. These individuals do not fit within the
autonomy paradigm governing professional roles. When faced with this situation
healthcare professionals often assume the patient's complete incapacity for
decisionmaking and assume the professionals know what is best. Even when a surrogate
is available for decisionmaking for patients, if the surrogate does not follow the
autonomy model, healthcare professionals make the same assumptions. Thus the
alternative for someone who does not or cannot fit within the paradigm is to be relegated
to the role o f subordinate or child and told what is best.
As a professional model for moral responsibility toward patients the prevailing view
primarily recognizes the obligations of professionals to maintain and optimize the
patient's or surrogate's capacities for autonomous choices. When autonomy is perceived
as lacking or otherwise inhibited, the moral concem focuses on enhancing the potential
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for autonomy to the extent possible so as to maximize that potential. This may be
sufficient for those patients and their close others who choose a strongly autonomous
approach to their decisionmaking while in a healthcare setting. It fails, however, to give
sufficient role guidance for interactions with patients who do not fit the expected norms
o f this model and its values of liberal individualism. It fails to pay appropriate attention
to distinctive aspects of individuals' lives which affect their particular view of self,
relationships and human life. All of these issues have profound effects on healthcare
decisionmaking and subsequent interactions between professionals and patients and
therefore should be part o f the considerations of healthcare professionals.
From the dominant view, professionals may assume that if the patient does not exhibit
the expected norms o f autonomy in healthcare decisiomnaking, someone else must speak
on behalf of the patient, and so a patient advocate is actively sought. In some situations,
but not all, this may be appropriate. Unfortunately, this may easily result in some
professionals assuming that those who do not exercise their autonomy rights are
incapable of doing so, either due to some kind of manipulation or lack of the necessary
capacities. It may also result in professionals assuming that the patient or surrogate does
not or cannot understand the information and therefore additional information is likely
needed. This may sometimes but not always be true. If the patient is known to not have
decisional capacity and the surrogate is not conforming to expected norms in the specific
situation, the professional staff may understand and accept the surrogate's reasoning, or
they may accept a more sinister connotation o f motivation, such as monetary benefits,
inheritance or the like. Any of these assumptions may easily regress into a kind of
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advocacy that is more like masked paternalism.
These assumptions can and do occur with some significant regularity, stemming from
a professional focus on patient rights and the obligations of professionals to maintain and
optimize those rights. Although not wholly wrong, it seems that what may be necessary
is a somewhat different bioethical grounding as an appropriate model for healthcare
professionals. Currently, patients or surrogates who do not embrace their autonomy
rights in healthcare decisionmaking are viewed by many healthcare professionals as
aberrant at best, incompetent or immoral at worst.
In considering an alternative perspective for the purpose of refocusing the moral
concerns o f healthcare professionals it will be necessary to change the lens in viewing
these concerns. Based on the empirical research o f Gilligan, such a shift from that of
rights and the individual to that o f care and connections changes the definition o f what
constitutes a moral problem and so leads to seeing the same situation in a different way.”
For example, a rights-based moral injunction for healthcare professionals is understood as
maintaining and enhancing the individual patient's autonomy for healthcare decisions.
This is not necessarily wrong moral motivation and behavior. However a care-based
moral injunction might change the understanding to that of not turning away from
relevant others in need. With this change in focus the professional's role and relationship
with the patient changes to one concerning responsibility not only to the individual
patient, but also close others who share an essential relationship with the patient and as
such are deserving of caring attitude, attention and behavior. From this view, the
healthcare professionals in Chapter 1 could consider their moral responsibilities to
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include considerations of the needs o f the spouses o f the patients. From this view, the
healthcare professional's role is one in which caring for the patient does not end with the
patient but rather extends to include those who are relevant in the patient's life.
Additionally, healthcare professionals might shift their view o f relationships between
self and others. A rights perspective views as centrally important an individual free of
controlling, manipulative influences o f others. A care perspective views relationships as
essential in the identity and survival o f the individual. With this shift the focus changes
to supporting the patient and important relationships to the extent possible as necessary
connections that extend the patient's sense o f self beliefs and values in the world, in
essence, the patient's self identity. The view of others changes from that o f potential
adversaries to that of a vital extension of the patient. Included in these necessary others
are the healthcare professionals, putting their relationship with the patient within that vital
extension as well. Viewing relationships with patients in this way requires a level of
commitment that goes beyond respect and advocating for rights. The motivation for the
professional is less one of protection o f an individual's rights, viewing the patient as
potentially in need of protection from others who could cause harm or claim conflicting
rights. It is more one of an imperative for viewing the patient as a whole person who is in
part defined by personal relationships and therefore the importance o f understanding,
maintaining and supporting those persons and relationships is stressed. From this
perspective, the healthcare professionals could view their moral responsibilities as
understanding the distinctive aspects o f the relationships between Mr. and Mrs. B and
between Mrs. M and her family. Understanding the distinctions which made the context
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o f their decisions clear could have formed the basis o f a caring and less adversarial
relationship between the spouses and the professionals. It can reasonably be assumed that
caring relationships and interactions would be not only preferable but beneficial to the
spouses rather than the added stress and discomfort created by an adversarial one. It can
likewise be reasonably assumed that the patients, had they been able, would likely
consider the caring, understanding and support of their spouses as beneficial to
themselves as well.
Taking the previous example one step further, healthcare professionals could view
their moral responsibilities as understanding the distinctiveness o f their individual
patients as whole persons. This would necessarily include understanding the importance
and fundamental influences o f culture, traditions, religious or spiritual beliefs and other
life contexts on a person's self identity, and the expressions o f values that may be evident
in their approach to decisionmaking. In the studies of attitudes and beliefs regarding
informed consent requirements outlined in Chapter 1, it was evident that healthcare
professionals need to be aware of a potential threat to some patients’ self identity by a
uniform approach to information requirements for informed consent. In a caring
approach to individual patients the professional begins from a recognition of the need in
all persons to understand and be understood as a person. From that beginning, a focus on
how to interact with this patient in order to maximize the potential for understanding
motivates the professional's interactions. Skillful communication and engagement with
the patient are necessary. If a grounding of understanding is to be established,
consideration of the whole person, including the patient's perspective regarding
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information, decisionmaking and relations with others is necessary.
These shifts in focus lead to a redefining o f the self as a moral agent.” An image of
the individual patient as a solitary figure in focus against a background o f others with
competing claims and self-interests sees the individual as the center o f consideration,
easily removed firom against this background. A change in this image sees the individual
patient within, among and tied to others through relationships, together forming the
foreground and background. As such, a web of relational human beings is in the center of
considerations because the individual can only artificially be removed from the others.
Within this perspective the professional self can be viewed as a moral agent who
responds to the perception o f need and who considers the patient as a whole.
Furthermore, the professional moves from the stance o f the passive advocate outside of
and directive to the moral agent to an active participant in the relational whole. This view
of the healthcare environment and the participants therein would necessarily include a
holistic identity of self. The moral question for the agent changes from. What are the
patient's rights and how do I support them? to. What are the needs o f this patient and how
do I respond? The skills required for this moral agent in consideration of moral actions
include engagement or attuned listening, engrossment or interpretive efforts geared
toward empathie understanding, active participation, and comfort with the unknown and
dynamic future. These kinds o f skills are not required in the paradigm of respect for rights
and universal principles, and hence the danger of the new question being answered from a
paternalistic view. They are required in the care model in order to assess the needs o f the
patient as the patient defines them and respond in ways that are meaningful and beneficial
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to the patient so that the patient recognizes them as such.
Which of the two models with their respective roles for healthcare professionals in
relation to patients and healthcare decisionmaking within the context o f healthcare is of
central importance? Both perspectives, that of rights and that o f care, can and have been
argued as appropriate bases for moral interactions. However, if one accepts that a view of
self, others, relationships and other life contingencies are socially situated and
individually constructed, then a moral model that views these notions from a singular
view may not be appropriate. It is conceivable that more than one view could be
appropriate, even necessary, to allow for moral interactions among proximate strangers
with differing views o f the self others, values, beliefs and traditions. Furthermore,
oppressive pressures that affect decisionmaking may originate from multiple sources,
including families, communities, socioeconomic status, gendered roles, cultural traditions
and the hierarchical culture of healthcare in institutional settings.^® Finally, there may be
aspects of both the autonomy model and the care model which could be appropriately
applied.
In a search for a theory of bioethics that allows for the scope o f diversity of
individuals, with their richness of values, traditions and beliefs and that allows for
professional roles which accommodate that diversity without compromising it, an
autonomy model based on rights, individualism and agreement seems limited. This is
particularly the case when considering the appropriate role o f healthcare professionals.
The autonomy model encompasses the values of liberal individualism that sustain this
country's social ethics. Respect for the autonomy of others, grounded in the claim o f a
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universal right to self-determination, should function as a principle guiding policy and
law concerning informed consent. However, the process by which individuals exercise
their right and which informs the appropriate role of healthcare professionals in that
process needs additional considerations. A care model based on relatedness and
understanding seems to be better suited for these process considerations in the context of
a healthcare setting. A shift to the focus o f a care model for appropriate moral concerns
of the healthcare professional's role with patients could alleviate some o f the tensions and
conflictual situations that posit a professional in the role o f protector of rights while
creating a potential for adversarial barriers with relevant others close to the patient. A
relation-centered professional role model could accommodate a complex of views,
values, beliefs and approaches to decisionmaking by considering the concreteness o f the
individual patient as a whole person, not isolated from life contingencies but in part
defined by them. Such a professional role could accommodate, through skills o f
understanding, a fully individuated autonomous person who values the right to make
personal choices according to self-chosen interests and values. It could equally
accommodate a person deeply coimected to a multifaceted community o f others who
would allow those others to make decisions for the patient based on what they determine
is best. It is not to say that the theoretical notion of autonomy cannot accommodate these
individuals. Rather, it is more that the current autonomy paradigm has been codified to
accept one specific view of decisionmaking through its requirements of informed consent
and the role of professionals tied to that view. What has resulted is an operationalized
theory of autonomy and its component model of informed consent, no longer understood
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as a partial moral concern but as an absolute.” Inclusion of care and coimectedness at
equal weight with rights and autonomy in the process o f informed consent and the moral
role o f professionals would balance the theory o f bioethics and open its discussions to the
benefit of all.

Conclusions
One o f the primary reasons that the prevailing model o f autonomy for healthcare
decisionmaking seems problematic as a moral grounding for relationships between
healthcare professionals and patients is that its assumptions are grounded primarily in a
social contract theory of the marketplace. This model supports such notions as a
conceptualization of the self as autonomous, that is, detached and essentially free of
dependence on others; a focus on rights and duties o f equal individuals; and a universal,
voluntary agreement on rules for adjudicating conflicts between individuals with little
formal concern for other factors that are largely considered irrelevant contingencies. Its
assumptions include that individuals ought to comply with principles for interactions that
would be accepted by most individuals who do not want to sacrifice their own interests
but are willing to compromise in order to obtain a mutually beneficial agreement between
relevant participants. This rationale was important during the seventeenth century
because it liberated individuals as their own moral agent from religious and political
authorities. The social contract model certified individuals as moral authorities and
obliged them to assume full responsibility for their moral beliefs and actions. The rights
it recognizes equip persons to assert their moral and personal autonomy while protecting
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them from unwanted interference. At the same time this model does not provide a
morally appropriate way to respond to the limitations o f its assumptions and its inherent
bias toward liberal individualism as a universally accepted value. Acceptance and
adherence to this model as an ideal for healthcare professionals in relation to specific
patients under their care fails to adequately capture the intimate nature o f a healthcare
setting and its relationships.
It has been argued by Donchin that there is much to value in current conceptions of
autonomy, such as its respect for others' voluntary decisionmaking, impartiality, and
autonomy as a goal for personal development. She further argues that "reworking the
conceptualizations of autonomy within medicine is more practical and thus preferable to
rejecting it in toto."^® She contends that universality is the primary problem that would
need to be abandoned. Further, she suggests a reconstruction of autonomy that integrates
both the general and concrete perspectives, drawing on a plurality o f perspectives for
appropriate application in different contexts o f human activity.
Meyers proposes a procedural view o f the autonomous self.” Her construction of
autonomy is built on what she terms "autonomy competency" which includes various
skills relating to the development of introspection, communication, reasoning, imagining
and others that enable individuals to direct and control their lives in harmony with their
true selves. Her account o f autonomy seems to characterize what she considers the
common struggle o f individuals in resisting inclinations to conform automatically or less
reflectively to social expectations.
Friedman has offered an account o f personal autonomy which views the self as
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primarily social/" She suggests that autonomy is gained by experience with a variety of
perspectives from which a person can assess choices regarding values. From this
approach, an individual's life has value to that individual not only because it is one's own
life, but because it is a life one has reason to value in part because one has been open to
other perspectives and freely chosen personal values rather than simply unreflectively
adhering to tradition. She contends that in contemporary society, especially in U.S.
society, persons are more likely to be part o f many communities. This multiplicity o f
value experiences can contribute to an individual's construction o f self identity through
choosing those that best meet with a particular view o f an ideal.
All three o f these reconstructions o f autonomy hint at the possibilities for how a
theory of autonomy could be enlarged to encompass the diversity of views o f self, others,
relationships and decisionmaking. In addition, they hint at how a reconceptualization of
autonomy could be used to change the understanding o f informed consent and the
appropriate role o f healthcare professionals. In this way, it may be possible to sustain the
values of liberal individualism and autonomy while broadening the definition,
interpretation and process of informed consent.
The healthcare culture and its institutions are a mirror reflection of the values and
structures o f U. S. society at large. Market values and the principles of social contract
are evident in every aspect of contemporary life and interactions. As healthcare is
marketized and patients are consumerized, the role of the healthcare professional has
become depersonalized. Because of the very intimate nature o f the healthcare setting, it
seems appropriate to shift the focus of healthcare professionals to that which is amenable
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to the context. The more fluid responses necessary in a care-based relationship-centered
model provide professionals with a role that allows for particularizing patients and their
needs. Further, it neutralizes the kinds o f conflicts and potential adversarial positions o f
professionals in a rights based model characterized in the studies and cases at the
beginning o f this thesis. For these reasons, bioethical theory should be striving to
incorporate the philosophical principle o f autonomy and the process o f care into a
comprehensive notion of what is meant by autonomy, informed consent, and the
appropriate role o f professionals.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

123

NOTES

1.

Anne Donchin, "Reworking Autonomy; Toward A Feminist Perspective,"

Cam bridge Oiiarterlv o f Healthcare Ethics 4, no. 1 (1995): 44-55, especially 47.

2. Women and Moral Theory. "Introduction" by Eva Kittay and Diana Meyers, eds.,
(Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1987), 5.
3. Carol Gilligan, "Moral Orientation and Moral Development," in Women and Moral
Theorv. 19-33.
4. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993),
33.
5.

Ibid., 19.

6.

Ibid., 73-74, and 151-174; see also Women and Moral Theorv. "Introduction," 7.

7. Nell Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education.
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1984), 100; see also Gilligan, (1993), 138.
8.

Gilligan, (1993), 173.

9. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. by Martin Ostwald, (New York: Macmillan,
1962).
10. David Hume, "An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature" in Moralitv.
Philosophv. and Practice. Abraham Edel, et al., eds., (New York: Magraw-Hill, 1988),
232-264.
11.

Women and Moral Theorv. "Introduction." 12.

12.

Ibid.

13.

Ibid., emphasis added.

14. Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan
Controversy and Moral Theory," in Women and Moral Theorv. 163.
15. Virginia Held, "Feminism and Moral Theory," and, Sara Ruddick, "Remarks on the
Sexual Politics of Reason," in Women and Moral Theorv. 111-128, and 237-260,
respectively.
16.

Carol Gilligan, (1987), 19-33, especially, 29.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

124

17. Sandra Harding, "The Curious Coincidence of Feminine and African Moralities:
Challenges for Feminist Theory, ” in Women and Moral Theorv. 296-315.
18.

Ibid., 308.

19.

Ibid., 310.

20.

Id.

21.

Ibid., 311.

22.

Gilligan, (1987), 31.

23.

Benhabib, 154-177, especially 163-167.

24.

Gilligan, (1987), 31.

25. Ibid.
26. Susan Sherwin, No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Healthcare. (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1992), 42.
27.

Donchin, 46.

28. Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 4th ed.,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), Chapter 2, especially 69-92.
29.

Donchin, 46-47.

30. Ibid., 45.
31. Ibid., 46.
32. Ibid., 48.
33. Mary Mahowald, "On Treatment o f Myopia: Feminist Standpoint Theory and
Bioethics," in Feminism and Bioethics. Bevond Reproduction. Susan Wolf, ed., (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 95-115.
34.

Gilligan, (1987), 20.

35.

Ibid., 23.

36.

Donchin, 49.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

125

37. Richard Double, "Two Types o f Autonomy Accounts," Canadian Journal of
Philosophv 22, no. I, (1992): 65-80.
38.

Donchin, 50.

39. Diana T. Meyers, Self. Societv and Personal Choice. (NY: Columbia University
Press, 1989).
40.

Marilyn Friedman, What Are Friends For? (NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTERS
REFRAMING AUTONOMY IN INFORMED CONSENT

Contemporary U. S. bioethics theory and practice emerged from the realization that
the drive for new medical knowledge and the application o f new technologies can
proceed to the detriment of society and individuals almost as if with a will o f its own.
Informed consent as a necessary element of medical practice developed out of that
realization and a concern for the ethical implications o f research practices and
applications o f medicine on human subjects and patients.
The ethical foundation o f informed consent lies in the promotion of two values:
personal well-being and self-determination of individuals.' In recent decades, various
efforts have attempted to ensure that these values are respected and enhanced. However,
informed consent as currently practiced has done little to effect these simple goals.
Informed consent as it was intended remains a myth. It is instead a legalistic event
designed to absolve medical professionals of their responsibilities to act in the best
interests of their patients. The myth is further perpetuated by the promotion of a
definition of autonomy that isolates patients not only from those who could help them to
heal, but also those who have been closest to them. Thus autonomy as currently accepted
for informed consent in most prominent bioethics theory can be considered a form of
abandonment of patients by viewing them as autonomous and then removing them from
126
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the context of others.
If the simple goals o f personal well-being and self-determination of individual
patients are to be reinstated as the goals o f informed consent, autonomy as the
overarching principle must be redefined in terms that go beyond the currently narrow
content o f capacities and actions. Similarly, the roles o f healthcare professionals and
families or close others must also be reconceptualized. Healthcare professionals must
have a role beyond the assessment of capacities and the duty o f providing information
which includes expectations that enhance the process o f patient decisionmaking and
sustain important relationships. Families and close others must be included as essentially
normative in the decisionmaking process o f patients rather than as competing and
conflicting interests. This redefinition of autonomy and reconceptualization o f roles as a
refocusing for bioethical theory and practice is the subject o f this chapter.
In each o f the preceding chapters, the focus has been on current U. S. bioethics theory
and practice concerning healthcare decisionmaking and informed consent. Chapter 1
demonstrated that the legal requirements o f informed consent directly conflict with
beliefs, traditions and practices o f certain groups o f Americans. For example, Navajo
beliefs preclude open discussions regarding possible future adverse outcomes and so
advance directives and disclosure for informed consent are not only eschewed but viewed
as potentially dangerous to the patient. Truthtelling and other such disclosures to patients
are for certain Mexican-Americans and Korean-Americans viewed as cruel and
burdensome, and so family members are considered those primarily responsible for
decisionmaking rather than patients. In addition to issues of cultural traditions and
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beliefs, the cases o f Mrs. B and Mrs. M demonstrated that spouses o f critically ill patients
are faced with decisionmaking responsibilities that at times place them in direct conflict
with the expectations and standards o f surrogate decisionmaking norms. All o f these
problems result from the way in which healthcare decisionmaking, particularly informed
consent, is constructed from a definition o f autonomy and its codification in the legal
requirements o f informed consent.
Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated how informed consent as the dominant legal and
ethical framework for medical research and healthcare decisionmaking is grounded in a
concept of autonomy as a view o f the self and others based on rights, duties and liberal
individualism. Chapter 4 discussed and contrasted an alternate view o f the self based on
a notion o f the essential importance o f relationships, interdependence and connectedness
of all living beings. When considered in relation to the problems demonstrated in
Chapter 1, these discussions reveal a need to enhance the quality of healthcare
interactions, including the healthcare decisionmaking process, between patients,
professionals and relevant others involved in that process.
This chapter will seek to provide an alternative approach to the limitations and
problems found within the current paradigm. Based on the discussions o f the preceding
chapters, it is evident that any attempt to remedy this situation within the current
bioethics framework must begin with an approach that seeks both to broaden the
definition o f autonomy for informed consent and to reconceptualize the roles of
professionals in their interactions with patients and relevant others. Only through such a
tandem approach will it be possible to effectively bring patients and professionals back
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together in the intimacy at the bedside and merge the art o f healing with the practice of
contemporary scientific medicine within healthcare decisionmaking. To this end, this
chapter will first focus on considerations for a redefinition o f autonomy in order to
broaden what is imderstood as an autonomous person with autonomous choices. This
redefinition will have implications for healthcare desisionmaking and informed consent.
Second, it will encompass a reconstruction o f the appropriate role o f healthcare
professionals in interactions with patients and their families in the process o f informed
consent in order to support and enhance the new understanding o f autonomy. Third, the
cases presented at the beginning o f this thesis will be reconsidered under the new
framework.

Autonomv Redefined
Under the predominant definition in current U. S. bioethics, autonomy is understood
to encompass two models o f characteristics o f individuals and their actions, the
authenticity model and the freedom model. The characteristics that define autonomous
individuals include independence understood as freedom from the controlling influences
of others, self-governance understood as the ability to determine one's own values, beliefs
and character, and self-actualization understood as the ability to make one's desires
realized through a life plan of actions. These characteristics define the autonomous self
as a person that is acting from the authentic self-motivation o f that person outside of the
substantial influence of others and thus is known as the authenticity model. The
characteristics of circumstances that result in autonomous actions include intentionality
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understood as an intended action, sufficient understanding o f relevant information, and
freedom from the controlling influence of others. Because the action is considered freely
enacted by the agent, this is known as the freedom model. Within this conceptualization
a person can be autonomous without necessarily acting autonomously. So autonomous
persons and actions are assumed to be judged separately. Yet what counts as an
autonomous person will affect what is considered an autonomous action. Thus they are
closely related.
This current autonomy model in healthcare assumes the liberal right of individuals to
self-determination, the most fundamental of liberal rights upheld in the U. S. Bill o f
Rights and supported in tort and statutory law. This right remains of primary importance
in any conceptualization of autonomy and informed consent. However, the current
definition is too narrow in scope regarding what counts as an autonomous person and
autonomous actions and what governs moral interactions with others. What is necessary,
then, is to broaden the scope of definition while preserving the importance o f the right of
self-determination.
The account o f autonomous persons and actions predominant in the bioethics
literature is a content specific account. This means that it proposes a set o f criteria that
persons or actions must meet in order to be considered autonomous, regardless of
individuals' agreement with the criteria. This approach can be contrasted with that of an
open account of autonomy that is based on the notion o f individual management styles. It
begins by assuming that individuals have a personal style for managing their own value
systems throughout their lives. This style inherently expresses how one believes that one
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should go about making choices, and in part causes the way one goes about making actual
choices. Thus an individual's management style is revealed in the way one goes about
making certain types of value choices, and it allows for persons to have different styles
for different types o f decisions.- Having an individual management style for
decisionmaking is essentially a way o f approaching decisions that elucidates one's values,
but it does not necessarily require conscious reflection on those values. Persons who are
autonomous are aware on a conscious level that they have a personal management style,
that is to say, they are aware that they make decisions in a particular way. But this does
not mean that they must consciously evaluate that style. That specific choices result from
an individual's management style for achieving the good is, however, a requirement of
this autonomy account.
An open-ended account of autonomy has several advantages over the current contentspecific accounts. First, a content-specific account makes autonomy the prerogative of
just those persons who meet the criteria. There are doubtless many individuals who live
and manage their lives according to their values that do not do so in a consciously selfreflective manner nor necessarily in accordance with other aspects of the criteria o f liberal
individualism.^ These individuals or their actions are frequently excluded from the
current view. In addition, content specific accounts of autonomy for informed consent
lead to the fragmentation o f the notion, as in "autonomy I" and "autonomy 2.""* Even if
one accepts that autonomy is an ambiguous term and as such these are only partial
accounts, in reality they do not capture the deepest intuitions of the notion of autonomy in
various contexts of uses. In a pluralistic society an open accoimt allows for what counts
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as autonomous choices across a broad spectrum o f values. By accepting a view that one
is autonomous when one chooses according to one's subjectively preferred management
style, this view embraces value pluralism. In contrast, in a content specific account, an
individual who is believed to have mistaken values caimot have true fi'eedom to choose
and so interference may seem justified in order to make them more fi’ee. Thus, the
individual management style o f autonomy circumvents the problem o f unwanted and
unwarranted interference. This is not to say that interference is never warranted. Rather
that interference based on the unilateral judgment o f another's values as mistaken is
unwarranted. Other justifications for interference may include protection o f innocent
others or protection of oneself.®
In considering this broader definition o f autonomy, doubtless there are several areas of
consideration that may make traditionalists uneasy. For this reason, two will be used here
as examples o f how this open account of autonomy can be further understood. First, in
the content specific definition of autonomy, the tradition holds that reflection on one's
choices is not just desirable but essential for autonomous decisions. This tradition stems
from a view o f hierarchical ordering of values and requires that if one is to act in order to
effect one's higher-order values, one must reflect on one’s lower order values or desires in
that process. Likewise, some see critical evaluation o f one's psychological states through
the process of self-reflection as a process that liberates us from our base desires and
makes us controllers o f our lives rather than passive bodies through which our inner
desires operate. Yet not all persons who are free and autonomous consider such
reflection a requirement in their decisionmaking. There are free-spirited individualists
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who prefer to act on impulse, as the moment arises, and who prefer to take life as it
comes rather than contemplating the details and 'what ifs' o f every decision to be made.
Likewise, many prefer to live life on-the-edge, without the worry o f potential but as yet
unrealized outcomes. For these persons, the rationalist style o f decisionmaking that
weighs the pros and cons o f all the options and then makes a decision based on the one
option that is likely, but not known, to deliver the best outcome, is one that would seem
burdensome at the very least. To force a rationalist style on these individuals would be
disruptive and intrusive to their management styles and likely reduce rather than enhance
their autonomy. Thus it can be argued that reflection is not really necessary for an
account of autonomous decisionmaking.
Another area for consideration in the content-specific account o f autonomy is the
quality o f the reasoning processes necessary for autonomous choices. In the predominant
approach, if one is not able to make decisions based on deductive reasoning that satisfies
a higher-order value or desire, one is usually considered incapable of autonomous
decisionmaking. The less rational the process, the less autonomous the choice. This
account requires that to be considered autonomous one must accept and proceed
according to a rationalist process of deliberation. Yet there are those who are
autonomous despite cognitive failings. The relevant determinant should instead be
reflective o f a person's individual management style, and whether the choices made are
produced from that style. If a person makes decisions based on a management style,
those decisions are more likely to be autonomous in the open definition o f autonomy than
are those made against or outside of that management style for that person. In this way.
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thinking for oneself occurs when done in accordance with ones preferred style o f
managing one's life and choices, even if this seems outrageous or foolish to others.®
An open account o f autonomy based in the assumption that autonomous individuals
have a subjectively preferred management style for value choices that is not subject to
many specifics may not be the most comprehensive answer to the task o f broadening the
concept o f autonomy. Nonetheless, it is a good place to start. From this position, it is
possible to discard what is too confining in the currently accepted definition to
accommodate pluralistic values and widen the circle of what is acceptable.
In broadening the scope of autonomy the next consideration is what should be
retained and/'or discarded in the current predominant definition. The view o f the self in
the current definition is one who is independent and freely chooses one's own life ends
without necessary regard to concrete circumstances or others as long as they do not
impinge on others' rights. In this view of the self, others figure only as tangential
contingencies that one may or may not choose to regard. This understanding o f the self
and others is limited if viewed from the perspective of those who do not see themselves
as individuals isolated from others but rather as essentially and vitally in relations with
others. It also is a view that is not consistent with most intuitions regarding relationships
between most patients and families. This is particularly true when families are
understood to include significant relationships to the patient that can be described in
terms of closeness rather than biology.’ However, if the view of the self is that of one
who is independent from others, then those who do not share that view are virtually
excluded from the view. On the other hand, if the self is viewed as essentially in relations

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

135

with others either intimately and distantly, it does not necessarily exclude those who see
themselves as independent, solitary authors o f their own lives and less in essential
relations with others. This second view is broader in that it accommodates both those
who view themselves as independent and those who view themselves as essentially
connected. It likewise allows for greater inclusion of others in the decisionmaking
process for those who view themselves as essentially connected with others or whose
traditions are such that the inclusion of others is normative.
'

*

Another point for reconsideration in the predominant view of the self is the claim of
universality of its values and application o f rules. In the predominant view, others are
potential rivals to the interests of the self. It does not matter what the nature o f the
relationship of these others is to the self because all others are self-interested and
therefore a potential threat to the individual. Therefore the principle o f noninterference
with others and vice versa is of primary value. Principles for determining moral
interactions between individuals are intended to protect the individual's right o f selfdetermination and freedom from unwanted interference, and apply universally to all
persons. The individuals can change, but the rules do not. This view is problematic in
that the particular social situations o f individuals and their relationships are not properly
taken into account. In so doing the view assumes that all individuals are equally situated
regarding the power within and the voluntariness of these relationships and the choices or
decisions they face. The claim of universality of both the value o f individualism and the
rules that sustain it is a reflection of a social experience that is in fact not universal. It is
therefore necessary to reject this value in defining a broader view o f the autonomous self.
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This is not to say that the rights of individuals to assert their self-determination and view
of personal well-being is to be rejected. Rather it is the claim o f the universal value o f
individualism and the universal application of rules to sustain that claim regardless o f the
individuals that are rejected.
With this rejection of individualism the consideration o f others in relation to the
individual changes. The current view of the autonomous self and others sets up a
dichotomy that pits individual interests against those o f the family. This is not only a
limited view in which close others are perceived as either threatening or nonthreatening
interests, but also the source of potential antagonistic relations between the family and
healthcare professionals who view their role as advocating specifically for the patient's
rights. The entire schema is bound in the legalistic view o f competing and conflicting
rights and interests. By rejecting the universality o f individualism and its rules for
interactions the view o f close others to the patient is allowed to widen. In this broader
view, the role o f family with the patient in healthcare decisionmaking is similarly allowed
to widen, and the process of informed decisionmaking can take on a new dimension.
This is not to be misunderstood as sanctioning the abandonment of the importance of
confidentiality between professional and patient. On the contrary, nothing in this account
argued here would support such a breach of trust. Any effective therapeutic relationship
requires a level o f trust in interactions that requires maintaining confidentiality to the
extent desired by the patient. Any discussion that included any other than the patient
would require the consent of the patient and should never be assumed.
In returning to the goals o f informed consent as outlined by the President's
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Commission, that of enhancing personal well-being and self-determination, it is possible
to understand how the current model o f informed consent has missed the point of its
intention. By relying on a model of autonomy that supports a legalistic view of
interactions between individuals focusing on rights, the intended goals o f informed
consent are lost to bioethics discussions. Instead, the goal has become that of sustaining a
particular view o f what is required to secure the right o f self-determination and bioethics
discussions are necessarily centered on or around that right. Broadening the view of
autonomy as demonstrated opens the discussions so that informed consent can be
reclaimed as the process it was intended to be and its goals reinstated as its proper focus.
The redefinition of autonomy as discussed moves in this direction. First, it begins
with a notion o f autonomy that is not bound to content-specific requirements for
autonomy to be satisfied by individuals. Rather it opens the notion in the sense that the
self-determination of autonomous persons is reflected in their decisiorunaking when those
decisions are consistent with a subjectively preferred individual management style.
Second, the redefined view of the autonomous self is a self that is understood as
essentially in relation with others, both intimately and distantly. In this way, decisions
made by those who consider themselves essentially connected to others, who may even
acquiesce to the authority of others for the purposes o f personal healthcare
decisionmaking, are considered essentially autonomous decisions. Although there is a
danger that some individuals may be coerced into decisions by others, it is not the starting
point for considerations. Rather, coercion is suspected only when there is sufficient
indications of its presence. Finally, the redefined notion of autonomy rejects the claim of
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universality regarding the value of individualism and the supporting rules governing
interactions between individuals. With this rejection, the singular view of others as the
source of competing rights and self-interests is rejected and replaced by a view o f close
others as a normative extension of the interests o f the patient. Together these form a
notion of autonomy that is more open in interpretation and more inclusive o f those
persons and actions that heretofore have been left out o f considerations of what it means
to be autonomous.

Reconceiving Informed Consent.
Familv and Professionals
In current U. S. bioethics discussions concerning informed consent, the primary
question regarding patients and families has been. Whose interests should take
precedence in healthcare decisionmaking when the interests of the patient and family
conflict? This is a result of the legalistic rights orientation of the definition of autonomy,
a focus on self-determination and a conception o f informed consent as an event. But with
the redefinition of autonomy and refocus on the patient's well-being in addition to selfdetermination, the question can be reffamed as. What are the respective roles o f the
patient, family and healthcare professionals in enhancing healthcare decisionmaking and
informed consent?* This redirection of informed consent to the intended goals arises
from the understanding that informed consent is not only the event of making a decision
at a moment in time and signing a form. In addition and more significantly, it is a
complex process involving not only the individual, but for the majority of persons close
others as well."
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A transformed notion of informed consent arising from the broader definition of
autonomy begins from this view o f decisionmaking as a process. In this process model,
the patient, family and healthcare practitioner, usually the physician, have access to facts
and values that have interrelated significance and evolve with discussion and over time.
The aim of the interaction is to determine the best health-related values for the patient
that can be realized in the clinical situation.'" Through discussion, the patient's healthrelated values are open to development, examination and revision. In addition, other
moral values not specifically health-related may be elucidated to directly or indirectly
impact the viable options. Thus, the goals of well-being and self-determination o f the
person are brought into conscious focus.
In most bioethics discussions regarding the role of family and healthcare
professionals in informed consent, the view has been that when there is no significant or
unresolvable conflict, the family assists the patient in decisionmaking whose autonomy is
generally seen as diminished due to illness or injury. The role o f healthcare professionals
involves the disclosure of information to the patient and family. They primarily provide
the details of options, likely risks and benefits and answers to questions by the patient and
family. These roles flow from the view of the patient as an essentially cognitive and
rational being who holds clearly discernable values which are easily articulated in
decisions regarding healthcare options once the relevant information is known and
understood. Consent becomes the event that takes place once the disclosure is made and
the information understood. In this view, the roles of the family and healthcare
professionals are largely peripheral to the patient's cogent and personal decisionmaking.
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When the patient’s decisionmaking capacity is severely impaired, the roles o f relevant
others consists in deciding the way the patient would have decided if preferences are
known or, if not known, deciding how the patient would likely have decided. These roles
are inadequate when considered in view of the redefined notion o f autonomy and
informed consent.
The importance of shared decisionmaking is included in the President's Commission's
articulation of the process of informed consent. ’' The sharing implies a division of labor,
so to speak, in which the practitioner labors over the available facts o f the situation and
options to be considered and the patient labors over the impact different options may have
on personal life values. When the two are brought together the resulting decision more
closely reflects the effort and perception o f enhancing the patient's personal well-being
for both practitioner and patient. In addition, unconscious influences often play into how
and why a person makes a particular decision and may become more apparent through
discussion in which the aim of well-being is prominent.” Finally, since well-being is
more than just physical and for many individuals difficult to elucidate, most patients will
significantly benefit from the active involvement of close others in the decisionmaking
process. This involvement in the process as normative further serves to diminish the
psychological isolation o f the patient, particularly in the institutional setting. Thus it
becomes obvious that in aiming to achieve the intended goals of informed consent, the
process requires the essential involvement of close others to the patient who may
contribute to the enhancement of the patient's sense and definition o f well-being and
bring to the foreground values, insights and intuitions that may remain otherwise hidden.
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In a reconstructed model o f informed consent, although reflective deliberation is not
required, it is highly desirable. Few other decisions in one's life can have such an
intimate, life-altering and often irreversible impact as those regarding potential risks and
benefits of various treatment options. Yet deliberation if done at all need not be done
alone to be considered expression o f self-determination or consistent with one's
conception o f well-being. Involvement o f those close to oneself is beneficial in
supporting the individual and contributing to the considerations of values or factors
possibly overlooked, forgotten or not previously considered. In addition, in order to
verify and clarify which of fleeting or vacillating expressions o f choices under stressful
circumstances disclose underlying values, the input o f others who know the patient well
and can place these in larger context is necessary.” Thus the role of family takes on
essential dimensions o f both interpretation and deliberation in the process of informed
consent. This expanded role as normative starts from an assumption of trust that is
foreign in the current model.
Similarly, disclosure of information by professionals need not be limited to the
recitation of facts and figures concerning potential risks, benefits, likely outcomes and
alternatives. It should include the integration of medical information with the relevant
values of the patient to formulate a coherent recommendation that takes both into full
account. Further, to expect that patients enter new situations facing new possibilities with
a coherent and well developed set of values to guide choices is not reasonable. To the
contrary, "the patient gains new appreciation for various treatments as she accumulates
experiential knowledge from undergoing them. This continuous refinement of
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knowledge and development o f preferences [in relation to values] are important aspects
o f process approaches to consent.'"'* Thus the process involves both clarification and
development of personal values with others close to the patient. The role o f the
healthcare professional in this process is in elucidating the health-related values inherent
in the different treatment options as they relate to the values o f patient. It will necessarily
require collaborative interaction not only with the patient but with the fami'y as well,
particularly if the condition is chronic or treatment is on-going. This kind of interaction
between professional and patient/family also requires a fundamental mutual trust and
respect.
In the redefined notion of autonomy and informed consent, the family is considered
an extension of the interests o f the patient and as such an essential and important part of
the decisionmaking process. Just as it is unlikely that patients arrive with fully
developed, consciously accessible values regarding medical treatment options, it is just as
unlikely for their families. And just as patients undergo a process o f clarification and
development of values concerning the impact of their choices, so do families. These are
not just parallel processes but also the same process taking place in an interactive and
interrelated way. It may be that long-held values are adapted to new treatment and illness
situations, or it may be a fundamental reordering of values incorporating new and
previously unknown values. Either way, informed consent is a process of mutual selfdiscovery that often redefines the individuals as well as the family as a whole.
Essentially, "In the process of decisionmaking, the context is also dynamic."
With this understanding of informed consent, values clarification or development and
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the role of the family, the interaction and relationship between professionals and family
should more closely mirror that between professional and patient. In the process model
of informed consent, the assumption is that values are not the private, privileged property
of the individual. Rather, "They take shape publicly, and when they are opaque or absent
their discovery or construction is also a communal process.'"® The role o f healthcare
professionals in this process is one of advocating for health-related values. This does not
mean advocating any and all treatment available as valuable in and o f itself. Rather, it
means to advocate for those treatments that are clearly beneficial to generally accepted
notions of health and well-being, and with limited risks. If the benefits are not so clear or
if the risks are high, then advocacy should recede. When the patient's and/or family's
refusal of a clearly high benefit/low risk treatment is consistent with stable long-held
values, the advocacy also should recede. If it is not, then advocacy for treatment should
proceed until the situation or the consistency changes. Caution must be taken, however,
so that advocacy does not proceed to coercion.
The role for professionals is not only as advocate for those treatment options that will
support the patient's values. It is also as advocate to support and maintain the
relationships that are important to the patient's sense of well-being and self as a person. It
is in this advocacy that the skills of communication, discernment, engagement and
engrossment are critical for the development o f professionals skilled at the art o f healing.
The art requires not only the knowledge and use of the tools of the profession, but also
the skills necessary to know the patient in order to know how to act in the patient's best
interest. It is obvious that to know the patient in this way professionals must understand
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the patient's sense of self which for most entails their close relationships. Thus a
professional cannot consider a therapeutic healing relationship with a patient without also
considering a similar relationship with others who are part o f the patient's self-definition.
In this way, relationships are interconnected, essential and part o f the professionals art of
healing.
In summary, the roles o f family and professionals in interactions with patients
throughout the process of decisionmaking is significant. In this new model o f informed
consent, the legal requirement can remain an event but it retains far less significance in
the overall process.

Informed Consent In Practice
At the beginning of this thesis, the problems encountered in the current framework of
autonomy and informed consent in healthcare decisionmaking were illustrated by
traditional Navajo spiritual beliefs affecting direct truthtelling about illness and outcomes,
Asian-American and Mexican-American cultural notions of self and others in the context
of illness, and the cases of Mrs. B and Mrs. M in the position of family faced with critical
decisions under constructed behavioral expectations resulting from standards for
surrogate decisionmaking. Within a redefined notion o f autonomy and informed consent
and the reconceived roles o f family and healthcare professionals, there exists the potential
for a new approach to these situations. From within this model, the situations o f
decisionmaking and informed consent presented in Chapter 1 will take on a different
configuration.
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Professionals educated about in this redefined notion o f autonomy and proficient in
the process model o f informed consent will be aware o f and open to the diversity o f
values concerning decisionmaking and notions o f consent. Professionals would expect
that individuals o f all ethnic and cultural backgrounds have traditional beliefs and
practices that shape those values and practices. The basic understanding would entail that
within groups, some follow traditional ways and others do not. The approach is one in
which each patient is treated as unique. So the need for the professional is to develop a
relationship with each patient that allows for important exchange o f knowledge
concerning the patient's preferences about healthcare decisionmaking. Further,
professionals must understand that individuals make value decisions based on a style of
decisionmaking that is comfortable to that person. Such decisionmaking styles do not
always follow a pattern o f conscious self-reflection and may appear to be irrational or at
least superficial. Some patients' traditions may include notions o f the family or elders as
the appropriate persons for directed disclosure and decisionmaking. Under a more open
understanding o f autonomy and self-determination, these would all be considered
potentially autonomous actions that may be revealed through skillful communication and
interaction.
For a practitioner in a Navajo tribe with patients who follow the traditional ways, the
focus on enhancing well-being and self-determination o f the individual patient comes
with a basic understanding of the traditional view o f the self in essential interaction with
the Universe. Cause and effect beliefs are part o f this understanding. Based on this
knowledge, understanding and communication with others in the community such as
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tribal leaders, council members or others in similar tribal communities will lead to a way
for respecting traditional beliefs while accomplishing the global intent o f policies
concerning informed consent. This could take the form o f discussing risks and benefits
or advance care planning in terms o f a fictional third party. Instead o f discussing
prognosis or the like in terms direct to the patient, the discussion could be conducted in a
series of questions such as. If you knew a tribal member such as yourself who had an
incurable illness, do you think that he or she would want to undergo chemotherapy if it
might prolong their life? Do you think that he or she would want chemotherapy if it
meant there might be significant side-effects? Do you think that he or she would want to
have surgery if it was likely that the surgery could relieve pain but there's a chance o f
paralysis too? And so on. This type of approach could provide for a meaningful
interaction that may elucidate the personal perspective about important treatment options
while maintaining the integrity of the patient's belief system with due respect.
The legal requirements o f disclosure for informed consent become secondary.
Although such legal considerations as consent forms are unlikely to disappear, they do
not necessarily have to remain in their present form, or they may be opted out o f for those
who do not believe in them. For example, if consent forms remained necessary for the
fulfillment of legal requirements, they could be revised to allow for the acknowledgement
of a discussion concerning potential risks, benefits, options and so on without being
directly about the patient. Discussion concerning these kinds o f efforts with tribal leaders
would yield far more satisfactory solutions and approaches based on the deepest
knowledge of their beliefs than is possible here. The point is that consent forms would
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not be the focus of care nor the foundation for an interventional approach to healthcare
decisionmaking.
Similarly, for practitioners who work in predominantly Mexican-American or AsianAmerican communities the expectation that some may hold the traditional views of
truthtelling in illness should be understood. Developing relationships with individual
patients would include knowledge o f or familiarity with close others as an extension of
the patient. Instead of assuming that patients wanted and should be told everything about
their illness and their options, the assumption would be that this is not normative in many
populations and so should proceed with perceptive awareness and careful interaction. For
patients who view family or elders as the appropriate ones to receive information and
make decisions for the patient, the interactions with family would not be considered
aberrant but normative.
The diversity in values, beliefs, perspectives, traditions, cultures, and ways of living
and knowing is itself understood and valued to the extent that practitioners must view
them not as exceptions or divergences to work around, but as integral to humanity and so
to be supported and preserved to the extent possible. Professionals in ethnic communities
who practiced from a such a model of autonomy and informed consent must be familiar
with and understand individual patients and their values sufficiently to integrate those
values, with the patient's agreement and participation, in developing treatment plans that
fit the context of the patient's life and sense o f self. In this way, the process preserves the
patient's integrity as part of the goal of maximizing the patient's life potential through
enhancing well-being and self-determination as patients themselves define them.
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Unless the legal requirements of informed consent are changed in a way that
alleviates the necessity o f disclosure, not a likely event, the legal aspects will have to be
dealt with in a maimer that allows for those who do not view direct disclosure as
beneficial to the patient. In the mean time, once professionals are able to discard the
previous notions o f autonomy and informed consent for the broader views and process
models, the goals of enhancing well-being and self-determination can readily embrace a
variety o f traditions and beliefs that include limitations on truthtelling and a more
extensive involvement of family and others. Attention must be paid to signs o f coercion
or abuse by those in positions of power, but this should not be the starting point o f
relationships with families. Rather, trust should be the basis of the interactions and
should only be questioned when there are signs to the contrary.
Interactions with surrogates will also be improved. Current standards o f surrogate
decisionmaking support the individualistic model o f autonomy. Expectations regarding
the decisions of surrogates based on this model often put them in direct conflict with
other legitimate concerns and interests. In the case of Mrs. B who was faced with the
responsibility of agreement with treatment limitations that would directly lead to her
husband's death, the healthcare professionals expected her to sign the consent in
agreement. Although they understood that she did not want to lose her husband in death,
the expectation remained as a result of their understanding of their role as patient
advocate. This narrow view of their role left them with little other choice for appropriate
interactions with Mrs. B, particularly after the patient's expression of readiness to die.
With a broadened understanding of autonomy that includes a view of the self as
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essentially connected to others, a self that is in part defined by one's relationships to
others, the advocacy role of healthcare professionals necessarily includes extension of
that role to others close to the patient. From this view, the interactions with Mrs. B must
not be adversarial but rather must take on the caring attitudes and behaviors that are an
extension of those with the patient. This view o f others is critical firom the perspective o f
a broader conception o f autonomy. To assume that close others are somehow
transformed into rivals of the patient once they enter the healthcare system is not only
contrary to the intuitions and experiences of most persons, but ludicrous as well.
Although there are instances where family or others may not reflect the patient's
perspective nor choice, this should not be the starting assumption for interactions with
family or others but rather surface only when there are indications for it.
The Nevada Statute requiring the written consent o f surrogates for treatment
limitations that may result in death was, in part, designed to protect individuals who do
not have an advance directive and who are facing a prolonged process of dying perhaps
against their wishes. The good intentions aside, this statute has instead resulted in forcing
countless surrogates to participate in what amounts to a legal absolution o f responsibility
for professionals and institutions. It effectively magnifies the emotional trauma that these
painful decisions normally entail without the intrusion and distrust o f a signed consent.
Such legal requirements as this only serve to perpetuate the notions o f others as
adversaries, both of the patient and of healthcare professionals, and so should be repealed
or at least not required.
In the case with Mrs. M, several issues will be alleviated by approaching the situation
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from the alternative perspective. First o f course is the view o f others as an extension of
the patient. Mrs. M and the patient had been married for many years. They had shared
cultural traditions from their birthplace that they had continued in their new life in
America. Even with the understanding that many marriages are not ideal regarding the
relations between wife and husband, nonetheless any long-term relationship remains for
some reason o f connection, healthy or otherwise. Unless there is significant reason to the
contrary, healthcare professionals must approach significant others from the perspective
that these others are important to the patient, an extension o f the patient's identity, and
have contributed to the whole of the patient's experiences o f life. From this essential
understanding, professionals must take into account close others and all relevant
information such as cultural or religious traditions or beliefs as part o f the patient's value
system and existential meaning of l i f e . I n this, family and close others remain inside the
circle of relationship with the patient and professional, instead of peripheral to it.
From within this circle of relationship, the healthcare professional's interactions must
seek to gain understanding o f the particularities o f the those in the circle. In the case of
Mrs. M, this would include the importance o f the role o f her sons in decisionmaking that
places her in a subservient role. As difficult as this is to accept for many in the Western
liberal cultures, it is not particularly unusual for the adult sons to figure prominently in
other cultures, particularly Eastern, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean. For Mrs. M to
eschew the decisions of her sons would have meant her own abandonment and
estrangement from family.
In this particular situation, the healthcare professionals must first have this
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understanding and second base their interactions with Mrs. M on this understanding in
the absence of a directive by Mr. M to the contrary. To presume that their role was
strictly that of advocating for what Mr. M presumably would have preferred is to neglect
the needs of Mrs. M and her role as essentially connected to Mr. M. This does not mean
that healthcare professionals must necessarily agree with such traditions or accept them
unquestioningly. It is appropriate for interactions by professionals to include attempts at
persuasion for a particular course of action that reflects certain health-related values. In
this case the staff would strongly advocate for treatment limitation with the sons, urging
them to consider that their father would prefer to die at home. In addition, nothing in this
approach requires healthcare professionals to provide treatment that is contrary to good
medical practice. For example, if it is against medical standards o f practice to do CPR on
a patient with end-stage cancer, and it is, then it would be appropriate to not initiate such
treatment or procedure. It places appropriate responsibility on the professionals to make
determinations regarding treatment indications and to refrain from offering inappropriate
treatment.'® For Mrs M, this approach would have removed the burden o f knowing that
she could not effectuate her husband's preferences without serious detriment to herself.
This approach would not have viewed Mrs. M's situation as a breech o f the patient's selfdetermination, but rather a result o f a cultural tradition that both the patient and Mrs. M
had lived with throughout their lives.
It is clear from this discussion of the situations outlined at the beginning o f this thesis
that an approach to healthcare decisionmaking and informed consent different from the
autonomy model currently practiced is needed. An open account o f autonomy that allows
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for individual management styles in decisionmaking, an understanding of individuals as
essentially in relations with others both intimately and distantly, and a view of
individualism as one of many ways o f living one's life all contribute to a re-informed
notion o f healthcare decisionmaking and informed consent. It is a means of returning to
the simple goals of informed consent as identified by the President's Commission. It is
also a means o f returning some o f the art o f healing in the roles of professionals in their
interactions with patients, families and significant others within the context of healthcare.

Making it Work
In order for the kinds of fundamental shifts in thinking and behaviors to occur in
healthcare as discussed in this chapter, there is at least one consideration that must be
undertaken in bringing them about. There must be an essential effort in the education of
professionals and the public for the shift to occur. The modes of thinking deeply
embedded in the current education o f professionals stem fi'om the indoctrination of the
professions with the individualistic model predominant in bioethics theory. Although it
is true that not all of the healthcare professions embrace that model with the same degree
of acceptance, nonetheless it is the model that predominates. The public has likewise
accepted the individualistic model at least superficially, although much of the
dissatisfaction with its limited views has originated from within their ranks.
Contemporary bioethical theory arose from concerns about the misuse of medicine,
research and medical technology, but in an effort to offer guidance it has espoused a
particular view to the virtual exclusion of others. These three areas, education o f the
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public, redirection o f the thinking o f healthcare professionals, and reworking bioethical
theory, need to be considered in terms o f how to effect the changes needed in order to
reframe healthcare decisionmaking.
The nature of the healthcare encounter, especially in institutions, is predominantly
one in which the patient is ill or injured. Even in the clinic setting many patients enter the
system seeking relief from a particular physical ailment. Daniel Callahan, widely known
and respected as the founder of the Hastings Center and a bioethics theorist, has
suggested that the experience of being sick or injured is an experience o f being
vulnerable, and when we are feeling vulnerable enough, we seek the help o f others. That
vulnerability creates a particular response in others. According to Callahan,
There is almost a universal sentiment...that there is some kind o f mutual obligation to
provide care. What is its basis? It is undoubtedly our shared sense that we cannot,
alone or on our own, cope with the ravages of illness and death, even though they are
our most private of experiences.. ..It is the vulnerability that illness creates that most
requires the response of others. 1 call that response one o f caring....Caring should
always take priority over curing for the most obvious of reasons: There is never any
certainty that our illnesses can be cured and our death averted. Eventually they will,
and must, triumph. Our victories over sickness and death are always temporary, but
our need for support, for caring, in the face of them is always permanent.”

From this view, the role of healthcare professionals is clearly one o f attention to the
needs o f the patient. That attention should include the particularity o f the person and
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their relationships in an illness experience. The understanding that caring for patients as
whole persons means including the patients' significant others, their ways o f managing
value decisions, traditions and beliefs that inform their identity, and their own definition
o f well-being even as they face the illness experience must become part o f how
professionals approach patients. Healthcare professionals must be educated in this way
of thinking so that such considerations are not secondary but rather primary because these
elements affect the meanings o f health, illness and medicine for the patient. If the goal of
benefitting the patient is to succeed, it must be in the terms o f what benefits the patient
seeks as meaningful to him or her.
The programs for healthcare education must be refocused to incorporate these
changes throughout the students' experiences. An ideal program would include not only
the science o f medicine and medical treatments, but what it means to be a professional. A
program such as that conceived by the Pew-Fetzer Task Force would be an excellent
starting point.-" According to the Task Force, education o f healthcare professionals must
include the understanding and experiences of professionals as part of a community in
which they provide a vital human service, even if they do not live in the immediate
community in which they practice. Their skills must include not only technical expertise
but the humanistic skills of communication, empathy and involvement. Understanding
what it means to be a healthcare professional entails understanding what it means to be ill
firom many different perspectives as well as the moral nature of professionalism. These
kinds of skills cannot be taught effectively by healthcare professions educators alone.
They point to the need for interdisciplinary programs that value both science and the
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humanities. Likewise it points to the need for education that takes place not only within
the healthcare institution but out in the community as well.
The role o f the public in the creation o f the current system and model should not be
underestimated. The appeal of a rights and liberties perspective concerning medical
treatment as a backlash against medical paternalism is understandable. Although widely
embraced by the public twenty years ago on the heels o f the civil rights movement, the
rights perspective over the ensuing years has not yielded the expected satisfaction with
the current model. This is likely due in part to the feelings of isolation and
depersonalization resulting from the role o f professionals as dispensers o f information
and rights advocates without the trust and understanding of a healing relationship. If the
role o f professionals begins to change, expectations regarding that role on the part of the
public will also change. If professionals are seen as participants in their care and the
guard can be let down, it is likely that trust will reappear and genuine communication and
exchange o f knowledge will occur. Without the element of trust in the person as
professional committed to the patient's benefit rather than other interests, the movement
of the public away from litigious attitudes that fueled professional and institutional legal
paranoia will not occur.
The standard approach in contemporary U. S. bioethics theory has been one in which
principlism is espoused as the accepted method o f moral reasoning and judgment. Most
of the texts used today in medical ethics education hold this tradition paramount in the
development o f moral reasoning among students in medical ethics and healthcare
students to a more limited extent. In fact, principlism has been called, "...the most
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popular and influential product in the current bioethical marketplace."-' The principlebased approach has become the standard for moral judgment in cases of medical ethical
dilemmas. Understanding of these principles and particularly that o f autonomy is
considered essential. However, application of principles even with considerable
understanding has at times served only to further detach professionals and patients from
each other and the very personal, emotional and often heart-wrenching reality o f the
situation.
Changes in bioethical theory and practice must spearhead any efforts at changing the
conceptions of professionals and the public concerning healthcare decisionmaking and
informed consent. The multifaceted nature o f considerations for a new paradigm in
bioethics points to the need for a truly multidisciplinary approach to the "demi-discipline"
of bioethics. There are certain basics which should be considered a core o f any
curriculum in the field. For example, the history o f medical ethics and bioethics would
give a background necessary for understanding the development o f the practices of
various healthcare professions, their codes of ethics, and the treatment of various issues
within the respective professions. Theoretical foundations and methods o f analysis in
moral arguments give an appreciation and understanding o f the nuances o f different
approaches in various theories. Familiarity with comparative analyses assists in
distinguishing and relating the perspectives provided by law, public policy and religion
on a particular issue. Knowledge of moral issues o f professionalism provides a basis for
understanding conflicts concerning professional responsibilities arising within the context
of current healthcare policies. Cultural influences on approaches to bioethical issues for
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individuals require understanding o f these aspects of dilemmas and skills of mediating
concerns o f those involved. Finally, the areas o f sociology, anthropology, literature and
other non-traditional resources for medical ethics provide a rich source o f information on
various aspects relevant to bioethical theory.- These interrelated multidisciplinary areas
should be considered essential for the study and practice o f bioethics.
Through such an integration o f sources of study, bioethics theory and practice can
pull away from its stuck position in individualism to embrace the expanded notions of
autonomy, self, others and personal management decisionmaking styles to reshape
informed consent. The lead o f bioethical theory and practice will help the professions
and the public move in this direction as it did following World War II. Toward that end,
substantial support for innovative and integrated programs in contemporary bioethics
should be essential in any considerations of how to implement the reconstruction of
autonomy, decisionmaking and informed consent in order to support the diversity of our
country and the basic values we share in healthcare.

Conclusions
This thesis has argued that there is a need to consider a shift in focus of healthcare
professionals from rights and duties of independent individuals to attitudes and
responsive relationships of healthcare professionals that support the diversity o f
individual patients encountered in the healthcare systems. The relationship between the
professional and the patient is the center of all healthcare and it is a conduit for all kinds
of information relevant to the success or failure o f a therapeutic intervention. As such, it
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functions as a factor in the psychological perception o f satisfaction or lack of satisfaction
in both patient and professional. Potentially it can likewise function as a conduit for the
benefits o f the art of healing missing in healthcare relationships that are trapped in the
limitations o f current definitions of self, others and appropriate professional interactions.
Relationships with others are equally important. Patients do not usually arrive on the
doorsteps o f the healthcare systems without current or prior relationships with others and
within the community and society in which they live. Similarly, healthcare professionals
usually do not function alone as solitary, isolated practitioners but in some manner of
connection with other professionals in their own field or in other fields of practice. In
addition, healthcare professionals usually describe themselves as serving a particular
community within which they practice. It is therefore consistent to include effective
relationships with and within the community and among all practitioners as essential in
considering an appropriate model for the role o f healthcare professionals in relations with
patients.
This thesis has sought to answer the question. Has autonomy misinformed informed
consent? More specifically the question can be understood as. Has an autonomy model
for healthcare in general and particularly decisionmaking, functioning as a paradigm for
expectations and relationships between healthcare professionals and patients,
misinformed the process and thus the intent o f self-determination through informed
consent? This question has come to the fore due to emerging data on cross-cultural issues
in informed consent and the growing experiential knowledge o f bioethicists in the
trenches. Such situations as described in Chapter 1 point to issues o f culture, spiritual
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beliefs, and other non-physiological factors which should be considered in healthcare
interactions and decisions. It also recognizes the devastation of relationships (e.g.,
surviving spouse and family, surviving spouse and healthcare professionals) that
sometimes occurs under the current obsession with one way o f viewing self, others and
professional responsibilities.
If meaning and depth are to be given to the principle o f respect for individual persons’
values and perspectives, then a deeper understanding and appreciation of differing values
and worldviews needs to be seriously undertaken by healthcare professions. This does
not necessarily mean that there need be different sets o f moral rules concerning informed
consent for each ethnic group, nor that all members o f a particular ethnicity will conform
to the traditional values of that group. Rather, it suggests that healthcare professionals
pay due attention to and value individual patients as whole persons with knowledge,
values, experience and relationships shaped in part by a view of self and others derived
from the context o f their lives. To attempt to accomplish this within a rights based
framework and scientific paradigm of twentieth century healthcare professional traditions
would be virtually impossible. An alternative framework that supports values common to
humanity rather than a privileged view could serve as a catalyst for movement of the
entire healthcare system paradigm in a direction that serves the needs of communities,
individual members of society and professionals alike. Although aimed at the healthcare
professions and medical culture, its force and broad application could manifest in a
similar reconstruction o f many other areas o f society, and result in a truly integrated,
humanity-centered nation that values its diversity as necessary for its survival.
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